Background to the Kismayo wars

[ina aadan]

Kismayo, the largest of the southern ports, has strategic significance, being half-way between Mogadishu and the Kenyan border. Lying at the mouth of the river Juba, it is also a commercial centre for products from the pastoral and agriculturally rich hinterland. Since January 1991, Kismayo has been relentlessly fought over by the USC, SPM, SNF, and SSDF.

The Jubaland Peace Agreement, signed on 6 August 1993, was heralded by UNOSOM as a breakthrough in the political reconciliation process in Somalia. It was presented to the international community as an example of how the UNOSOM peace-keeping operation was working in Somalia. In mid-August, Kismayo and the Juba valley as far as Jilib were, on the surface, peaceful. It was possible to drive in the valley and Kismayo without armed guards. There are, however, some concerns about the sustainability of the peace accord. There remain some groups who are hostile to it.

The Oxfam agricultural programme in the Lower Juba region is, arguably, Oxfam's most successful programme in southern Somalia to date. It is a programme that has been developed under extremely difficult security conditions. At one time the whole of the national team was forced to evacuate Kismayo, when one military faction took over from another. The success or failure of the peace accord has implications for the future of the Oxfam programme. The following endeavours to document the history of the Kismayo conflict and the UN-brokered peace process there.

1.1 Jubaland

Jubaland is the name coined by the British to describe the land between the Juba river ('the Nile of East Africa') and the Tana river in northern Kenya. In 1924 this land, as far south as Doble and Ras Camboni, was ceded by the British to the Italians.

Jubaland, according to the Addis Ababa Agreement, incorporates Gedo, and the Middle and Lower Juba regions. Up to 1975 the area consisted of two regions, Lower and Upper Juba. In 1975 these were carved into Middle and Lower Juba, Gedo, Bai and Bakool. This move was considered to be politically motivated by Siad Barre, who created Gedo as a Marehan region, including Bardheere town. Under the Addis Ababa agreement, these regions remain in place, so that 'Jubaland' refers to the whole of the area between the Juba river and the Kenyan border.

One factor lying behind the protracted nature of the conflict in Lower Juba is the complex clan composition of the area. The riverine areas of southern Somalia lack the homogeneity of the northern regions. There is a diversity of oral and material culture and a diverse complexity of social organisation not found among the more homogeneous northern pastoralists. It is an area where pastoral, agricultural, and coastal traditions meet.

In the Lower Juba region there are several large clan confederations, practicing different economic activities:

Pastoralists:19
Ogadeni (Awlihan, Muqaabul, Bartire, Mohamed Zubeir)
Marehan
Hawiye (Galjaal)
Biyamal (Dir)

Agriculturalists:
Hawiye (Sheikal, Xawadle)
Bantu

Coastal:
Banjuni
Tuuni
Harti (Majeerteen, Warsengeli, Dolbahunte) businessmen.

The 'Bantu' people (also known by Somalis as tima-jereer - 'hard hair' - or tima-ada - 'tough-haired' - or by the European term Gosha 'forest') are found along the course of the river Juba. They divide into two main groups:

· Mushunguli or Wa Zugua. They are thought to be descendants of ex-slaves from Tanzania, who arrived during the great drought in 1836. They retain their East African identity, and speak Swahili and af maymay. They are found in a fairly contiguous territory between Zunguri and Kamsuma along the Juba.

· Shanbara ('group of five'): These include the Myao, Mkuwa, Mgindu, Mlima, and Nyasa, who are also descendants of former slaves from Tanzania, Mozambique and Malawi. They are found north of the Mushunguli, north of Jilib, and have become more integrated into Somali society as bond groups to Somali clans. Most have taken on Somali names.

1.2 Historical Conflicts

Central to the conflict in lower Juba is a question of territorial ownership and control over resources. The main players are the Hawiye, Ogaden, Harti and Marehan. They all make historical claims to the control of Kismayo and its hinterland. The dispute, as it has developed, is largely between the Darod (see diagram 8), in particular between the Ogaden, Marehan and the Harti, rather than between the Darod and Hawiye.20

Kismayo was originally settled by the Banjuni people and only developed as an urban centre in the 1880s, when the Sultan of Zanzibar held suzerainty over Kismayo.

In 1865 the Ogaden crossed from the east to the west side of the Juba river, pushing out the Oromo, who had been weakened by a smallpox epidemic, and gained control of pastoral lands between the Juba and the Tana rivers. According to the Ogaden, the first inhabitants of Kismayo were Ogaden Muqaabul, who are now concentrated in Badade district south of Kismayo.

The first evidence of Harti settlement in Kismayo dates from the 1880s, when Harti traders from north-east Somalia established a foothold in the town. The main Harti group to settle in the town were Majeerteen traders from Ras Hafuun, who were known as 'Hafuuni'. Conflicts between the Osman Mahmoud and the Ali Suleiban Majeerteen, in north-east Somalia, led many of the Ali Suleiban to migrate to Kismayo (see diagram 8). Further migrations by the Issa Mahmoud and the Dolbahunte took place during the wars of the Sayid Abdulla Hassan (the 'Mad Mullah'), in the first two decades of this century.




Diagram 8: Darod Genealogy



Diagram 9: Ogaden Genealogy



Diagram 10: Majeerteen Genealogy
Under the British administration the Harti became a strong mercantile class in Kismayo. They were also the first Somali employees of the British administration, thereby establishing themselves as an educated urban professional class. They maintained this position under the Italians, when Kismayo was ceded to them in 1926. The Harti therefore claim long-term settlement and trading rights in Kismayo, and cite as evidence the 1968 elections, when the four MPs from Kismayo were all Harti.

Hawiye interests in Kismayo are based on the presence of Galgaal in the area. They were displaced into the area earlier this century, having been driven southwards by the Rahanweyne. Other Hawiye clans, such as the Xawadle and Sheikal, are more recent residents in the region. Frequent land disputes between the Majeerteen and the Ogadenis took place in the early part of this century. In one famous battle some 80 Harti were killed. The Ogadenis refer to the area of the battle as 'lafara ha tiga' ('the bones of Harti'), while the Harti refer to it as 'lafara ha rage' ('the bones of men'). Jubaland was also the scene of frequent fights between the Awlihan/Ogaden and the Marehan in the first two decades of this century.

At the time when Kismayo was ceded to Italy, the British are said to have enforced an agreement between the Harti and Ogadenis. According to the Ogaden, the agreement found in favour of the Ogadenis, giving their Sultan Ahmed Magan overall authority in Jubaland. This has now passed to his grandson Sultan Abdi Ali 'Songkor'. According to the Harti, the agreements stipulated that the Ogaden (mainly Mohamed Zubeir) should stay north of what is now the Liboi-Kismayo road, while the area south of this remained under the control of the Harti. By this agreement the Mohamed Zubeir Ogaden were also given access to the port.21

1.3 Uneven Development

As one of the prime sites for agricultural development in Somalia, the Juba region attracted the attention of British and Italian colonial officials. Plans to develop cotton production failed, owing to labour and transport constraints. Instead, during the 1930s the Italian plantation sector was expanded through the use of forced labour.

In the 1950s and 1960s foreign assistance and development projects focused on small-scale agriculture, targeting small-holders, with small-scale cash-cropping (cotton) and the extension of social services (e.g. Jamaame Mennonite School).

In the 1970s and 1980s, foreign technical and financial assistance was invested in large-scale development projects. These included Fanoole Rice Farm, comprising 8,000 hectares, Mogambo Irrigation Project, comprising 2,700 hectares, and Juba Sugar Project, comprising 20,000 hectares. Banana plantations were expanded and a number of large state farms were created. These projects, focused on replacing staple food crops with cash crops (cotton, sugar and bananas), expropriated vast areas of land from small-holders. The effect was to marginalise the small-holders and enhance the value of the riverine lands to outside investors. Wealthy Somalis, especially civil servants from Mogadishu, used land-registration laws to expropriate village plots in the valley throughout the 1980s.

The same process occurred in the pastoral sector, where development projects which increased the number of watering points in the lower Juba attracted powerful pastoral groups from outside the region.

In addition a number of infrastructural, industrial, and service projects were undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s with foreign assistance. These included highway construction from Kismayo to Mogadishu (Italy), bridge construction (EC), a meat factory and tannery in Kismayo (USSR), port rehabilitation (USAID), primary health care (UNICEF, World Concern, CISP), Kismayo hospital (China), hydro-electric power grid to Jilib (China), Juba sugar refinery (Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia), and the Kismayo power plant (FINIDA). These infrastructural projects benefited Kismayo and the main urban centres, rather than the impoverished rural population (Menkhaus, 1993).

1.4 A Conflict over Resources

The overt starting point of the conflict in the Juba valley was April 1989, when Ogadeni officers mutinied in Kismayo and formed the SPM. The mutiny was in direct response to the sacking and imprisonment by Said Barre of the powerful Ogadeni Minister of Defence, Aden Abdallahi Nur 'Gabiyo'. The sacking of Gabiyo was the catalyst for a conflict that had been smouldering over a number of years.

One analysis of the conflict in Kismayo identifies its roots in ecological pressures which caused competition over resources in the pastoral rangelands to the west of the Juba river. Gedo region is primarily a pastoral region. The predominant Marehan population there herd substantial numbers of camels. Ecological pressures in Gedo region, caused partly by the influx of Ethiopian refugees into that region in the early 1980s, resulted in a southwards encroachment of Marehan pastoralists into Ogadeni grazing lands (degaan). Backed by the thinly veiled Marehan regime of Siad Barre, this led to armed conflicts between the Marehan and Ogadenis around Afmedu in 1988.

A further source of dispute was the proposed construction of the Bardheere dam, which was intended to bring large areas of land under irrigation. At that time Bardheere was divided between the Awlihan on the west bank and the Rahanweyne on the east bank. (Gabiyo's subclan, Rer Ali/Awlihan, is from Bardheere.) The dam was never built, because of the war. The project would have reduced the available grazing lands and thus increased land values and competition between the Ogadenis and Marehan. The regional Governor at that time, Abdillahi Wagat (a Marehan recently appointed again as 'governor' in Kismayo by General Morgan), tried to mediate between the Ogaden and Marehan, but with no success. The sacking of Gabiyo, therefore, only accelerated a conflict over resources that was already spreading.

1.5 The SPM and SNF

The first leader of the SPM, General Bashir 'Beliliqo' (Awlihan/Ogaden), was a brother-inlaw of Gabiyo. Through his mother's line, he also received support from the MohamedZubeir/Ogaden. The SPM was badly defeated in September 1989, in a campaign led by Siad Barre's son General Masleh, and Beliliqo was forced to flee to Kenya.

In June 1989, however, a second SPM (Ogadeni) front had been opened up in the south-west, after Colonel Omar Jess (Mohamed Zubeir/Ogaden) defected from Hargeisa. By January 1990 Jess controlled Bakool region, where he obtained the support of the Awlihan Ogaden. In August 1990, the SNM, USC and SPM agreed to coordinate operations against Barre.

In January 1991, as the USC fought Barre in Mogadishu, the SPM threatened to seal off his retreat south at Afgoi. However, after Barre fled from Mogadishu, USC leaders lost control of the situation and fighting erupted in February 1991 between the USC and the SPM in Afgoi. The defeated SPM were forced to flee south to Kismayo, where they joined up with other disparate Darod who had fled from Mogadishu. The front line between the USC and SPM/SNF passed through the Juba valley three times between February and April 1991. The USC finally captured Kismayo at the end of April 1991, and the SPM/SNF were pushed south of Doble.

When the USC overran Mogadishu, Gabiyo was released from prison. At the time Beliliqo's supporters came from the Awlihan, Mohamed Zubeir and Muqaabul in the Lower and Middle Juba, while Jess's support came from the Awlihan in Bakool, and Mohamed Zubeir in Ethiopia.

Following their defeat the various Darod factions, including the SPM (Ogadeni), SSDF (Hart)) and SNF (Marehan), regrouped under the banner of the SPM. Internal Darod conflicts over land were forgotten in the face of the anti-Darod rhetoric from Aideed, who proclaimed his intention of clearing all Darod from Somalia. Gabiyo was appointed the new chairman of the SPM, and Jess the military commander. General Morgan (Majeerteen and Barre's son-in-law) was given charge of the police. The election of Gabiyo as the Chairman led to a rift between Gabiyo and Jess. It is suggested that Gabiyo was elected chairman to ensure the support of his Awlihan clan, who up until then had been supporting Jess.

In June 1991, the SPM recaptured Kismayo and Brava. A second attempt to retake Mogadishu was again defeated by the USC. In December 1991, during the reelection of the SPM chairman, Gabiyo and Morgan combined forces to remove Jess's forces from Kismayo and Brava. Jess then went on to form an alliance with Aideed's USC, which became known as the Somali Liberation Army (SLA). Their combined forces managed to push Gabiyo and Morgan out of Kismayo and in April 1992 forced Barre into exile in Kenya. Following this victory Aideed and Jess formed the Somali National Alliance (SNA), combining together with the SDM and the SSNM.

Following their defeat in Kismayo, there was an attempt by the Majeerteen to replace Morgan as army commander with General Hirani (Awrtabley). Some 40 Majeerteen elders in Kenya signed a letter replacing him, and his supply routes from Kenya were cut. Morgan responded by professing to be fighting, not just for the Majeerteen, but all the Darod. In this way Morgan managed to gather the support of the Marehan. With Marehan support, and allegedly resupplied by the Kenyan military, he was able to move up the Kenyan border to El Wak. From there he was able to recapture Gedo and went on to take Saakow, Bu'aale, and Afmedow (a Mohamed Zubeir town) and Bardheere in October 1992. He also managed to cut the Kismayo-Liboi road and capture Liboi from Jess. At this point UNITAF intervened in Somalia.

It has been suggested that when UNITAF arrived, Aideed's power was in decline, under pressure on fronts in the south and north-east. This is why Aideed is thought to have accepted the US intervention. With the arrival of the UNITAF, supporters of Omar Jess, fearful that they might lose Kismayo, were involved in the assassination of over 100 Harti people in the town between 8 and 10 December 1992.

In January 1993, Morgan attempted to recapture Kismayo but was repulsed by the US military. On 22 February, two weeks before the start of the National Reconciliation Conference in Addis Ababa, Morgan was able to infiltrate fighters into Kismayo, and after some bloody street battles routed Jess's forces and recaptured the town. Jess's forces had been deprived of their heavy weapons by the UNITAF disarmament programme.

Interpretations of the events that enabled Morgan to capture Kismayo vary. The USC/SNA alliance believe that the Belgian UNOSOM forces are not impartial, and Morgan's soldiers were allowed into Kismayo. Some Harti believe that UNOSOM allowed Morgan to re-enter Kismayo, because 'they view it as a Harti town'. This is despite the fact that, when US forces first arrived in Somalia, US Ambassador Oakley refused to meet the 'cold-blooded murderer' Morgan. The other interpretation is that UNOSOM Belgian troops were outwitted by Morgan. Whatever the truth, the SNA/USC supporters remain extremely bitter. Their cynicism is increased by the fact that since February 1993 the US and Belgian troops have twice repulsed attacks by Jess fighters on Kismayo.

Since March, therefore, Kismayo has nominally been under the control of an alliance of SPM/SNF/SSDF forces (in Kismayo known as the SPM), under the overall command of Morgan. Nominally, because Morgan himself has not returned to Kismayo and remains in Doble, and also, because his supporters have no visible military presence on the streets of Kismayo. The rise of Morgan, as the 'champion of the Darod', seems to have sidelined Gabiyo, although he was one of the 15 signatories of the Addis Ababa agreement.