Is Iran Asking For It?

[Poetess]

From Iran with love, read the last dozen mortar shells to richotchet in the 3rd Infantry Division's camp. Perhaps the Mullahs are trying to tell us something?

Mark Steyn, National Review

The New York Sun’s Eli Lake had an interesting story the other day about various Iranian documents recently found in Iraq. According to a US intelligence official, the cache confirms that “Iran is working closely with both the Shiite militias and Sunni Jihadist groups.”

Got that? In Iraq’s alleged Sunni-Shia “civil war”, Iran has checked the both-of-the-above box. On the face of it, that doesn’t make a lot of sense. Why would Shia Iran support Sunni Iraqis who kill Shia Iraqis?

Because Iraq is not about Iraq. It’s about America.

The mullahs get that, even if the entire Democratic Party and half the Republicans don’t. It’s in Iran’s interest for the US adventure in Mesopotamia to end in a failure so chastening if not traumatizing that Washington withdraws from the region. So to that end they have arranged a proxy war. Once upon a time, every itsy-bitsy dust-up on the planet was a proxy war: the Soviets had their guy in North Wackistan, and the west had its man in South Wackistan, and they went at it and one of them came out on top. But, since the Cold War, we seem to have lost the knack of picking sides in proxy wars so the Iranians saved us the trouble and picked both sides.

For three years, the naysayers kept assuring us there was a “civil war” in Iraq, and the Iraqis kept declining to show up for it. Then the Iranians decided to get serious about it, and to them it doesn’t matter a whole lot whether Shia Iraqis kill Sunni Iraqis or vice-versa. Indeed, a straightforward “civil war” in Iraq would be over very quickly: There aren’t a lot of Sunnis and the Shia could deal with them swiftly and nastily. Hence, Tehran’s admirably bipartisan approach.

Iran appreciates what fewer and fewer Washington panjandrums grasp – that Iraq is but one front in a broader conflict. These days we spend an inordinate amount of time obsessing on micro-features of the Iraqi internal scene – the merits of this or that party over this or that militia, how such and such a parliamentarian brings leverage to bear on such and such a cleric. We ought to understand, as the Iranians do, that our strategy in Iraq has to advance our objectives in the wider war. So, for example, increasing troop numbers will be a waste of time if Washington, in effect, falls for the role in which the Iranians have cast it – the third party stuck in the middle of an unending sectarian struggle. You might stabilize Baghdad, but not for long. Increasing troop numbers would be useful only if it advanced our broader interests.

Colin Powell famously framed his advice on Iraq in Pottery Barn terms: you break it, you own it. But, as I point out in my book, after the fall of Saddam our enemies concluded the opposite: we didn’t have the guts to break it; therefore, we didn’t own it. In being willing to supply Sunni terror groups with the wherewithal to bomb Shia mosques, Iran is demonstrating it does have the guts to break it - and may well end up owning it.

America, of course, cannot really “break” Iraq: it fights with one hand tied behind its back, constrained not only by the UN, the media et al but by its sense of itself as a civilized democracy. Therefore, any troop surge in the cause of a defensive policing operation will by definition be transitory. You cannot break this enemy fighting his stooges in Baghdad and al-Anbar.

At the risk of spending the whole column quoting myself, here’s another reprise. In the summer of 2002, Amr Moussa, Secretary-General of the Arab League, warned BBC listeners that a US invasion would “threaten the whole stability of the Middle East”. I wrote: “He’s missing the point: that’s the reason it’s such a great idea.” Invading Iraq made sense because it offered the best way to prick the puffed-up pustule of regional stability. We seem to have forgotten that. The Iranians haven’t. They’re at war with us, but they reserve the right to pick the kind of war that suits them. Tank battles, naval bombardments, air strikes would be a disaster for them: that kind of war they’d lose very quickly. But asymmetrical insurgencies suits them just fine: that kind of war grinds down the superpower.

I’m not advocating instant bombardments of Tehran. But Iran has plenty of proxies: some are strong, some aren’t. Syria is a weak proxy which nevertheless has been allowed to subvert post-Saddam for almost four years. The argument made by George W Bush – we’re fighting them over there so we don’t have to fight them here – is a good one: it’s always better to wage war on foreign soil. But, psychologically, in the eyes of the world, Iraq for the moment isn’t “foreign” soil: it’s ours. So the Administration should follow its catchphrase to its logical conclusion: let’s fight on the offense on enemy turf, so we don’t have to play defense on ours. If Iran can arrange both sides of a “civil war” on our side of the border, why can’t we cause some trouble on theirs?

[gurey25]

whats your beef with Iran?

they are simply making use of the wonderfull possibiiltes given to them, due to Bush's silly little war.

[Poetess]

There's no ill will on my side. The Mad mullahs of Tehran and Qom want to play footsie, and I believe in returning the favor, especially when they send gifts bearing the message, "from Tehran with love".

Nothing wrong with common courtesy is there Gurey dearest?

[Poetess]

A US withdrawal from Iraq would see an orgy of slaughter, mostly on the part of the shiites. This at least may seem enough of a truism, to pass without comment. Not so however for Sunnis. "Death to America" the feircely bearded men screech, forgetting that withdrawal time for them is dying time.

Gotta tip your hat to the Mullahs of Iran, however. Who would've imagined they had a hand in each sectarian pie? Egging on not just their stooge Moqtada and his Mahdi militia to massacre with abandon, but equally their arch foes, the wahhabi chaps.

Allah's name be praised. Perhaps it's time the US sends her own messsage to Ahmedenijad: "From the US with malice."

[gurey25]

becuase you swallow whatever bull thrown up by fox,

you are also underestimating the Sunnis arab in Iraq.

you are forgeting that if you add the Sunni arabs, the majority of kurds that are sunni and the Turkomens, you have nearly 60% a majority of Iraq.

Iran is not stupid, they recognize the demographic realities, all they care about is a friendly iraq idealy subservient to Iranian insterest.

this is why they are cozy witht he Sunni arabs in iraq, and they are behaving like a young lover proposing marraige with the Kurds, and a the same time maing sure that most shiite factions play the Iranian tune.


Iran runs iraq already, the US soldiers are fighting and dying for Iran.

[Cilmiile]

If Americans were smart they would get out of the whole middle east. Why should they fight anybody at all?

[michael_ital]

Ciilmiile

For Israel

[wadaniweyn1]

no dumb dhiilo ur moma's pusssy is asking 4 it
it's funny thou how u read and believe the national review
those ppl r the most neo conservative nazi's any where n i would not
believe anything they say. anyway don't waste ur time reading those
kind of editorial's , those ppl r the most nationalistic pro jews u can
find anywhere.


muse issaqson.

[Grant]

I found this interesting, and not exactly something you would hear on Fox News:

The United States, Iran and the Iraq Negotiation Process
By George Friedman and Reva Bhalla

At long last, the United States and Iran announced May 13 that they will engage in direct public bilateral talks over Iraq. From Washington, it was the office of Vice President ceeb Cheney and the National Security Council that broke the news. From Tehran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad confirmed that the two sides will meet in Baghdad in a few weeks, most likely at the ambassadorial level. That makes these talks as officially sanctioned as they can be.

Already there have been two brief public meetings -- albeit on the sidelines of two international conferences -- between senior officials from the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the U.S. State Department in March in Baghdad and in May in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. The upcoming meeting in Baghdad, however, will be the first official bilateral meeting. After months of intense back-channel discussions, both sides have made a critical decision to bring their private negotiations into the public sphere, which means Tehran and Washington must have reached some consensus on the general framework of the negotiations on how to stabilize Iraq.

Why Now?

The U.S. political situation illustrates why both sides are willing to come to the table right now. Both Iran and the United States are closely eyeing each other's busted flushes, and they understand that time is not on their respective sides.

From the U.S. perspective, it is no secret the Iraq war has soaked up an enormous amount of U.S. military bandwidth. With the 2008 presidential election fast approaching, the Bush administration is left with little time to put a plan in action that would demonstrate some progress toward stabilizing Iraq. It has also become painfully obvious that U.S. military force alone will not succeed in suppressing Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias enough to allow the government in Baghdad to function -- and for Washington to develop a real exit strategy. But by defiantly sending more troops to Iraq against all odds, Bush is sending a clear signal to Iran that it is not in the Iranians' interest to wait out this administration, and that the United States is prepared to use its forces to block Iranian aspirations to dominate Iraq.

From the Iranian perspective, Tehran knows it is dealing with a weak U.S. president right now, and that the next U.S. president probably will have much greater freedom of action than Bush currently does. The Iranians learned that dealing with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter would have been preferable to dealing with his successor. If you know negotiations are inevitable, it is better to negotiate with the weak outgoing president than try to extract concessions from a strong president during an increasingly complicated situation. The Iranians also know that the intensely fractious nature of Iraq's Shiite bloc -- which Iran depends on to project its power -- makes it all the more difficult for Tehran to consolidate its gains the longer Iraq remains in chaos.

U.S. and Iranian Demands

And so the time has come for both Iran and the United States to show their cards by laying out their demands for public viewing.

U.S. demands for Iraq are fairly straightforward. Our understanding of what Washington wants from Tehran regarding Iraq rests on these key points:

1. The United States wants Iraq to be a unified and independent state. In other words, Washington knows a pro-U.S. regime in Baghdad is impossible at this point, but Washington is not going to permit an Iranian-dominated state either.

2. The United States does not want jihadists operating in Iraq.

3. The United States wants to be able to withdraw from security operations, but not precipitously, thereby allaying Sunni Arab states' concerns.

Essentially, the United States is looking to create an Iraqi government that, while dominated by the Shia, remains neutral to Iran, hostile to jihadists and accommodating to mainstream Sunnis.

Iranian Demands

Iran's answers to these demands were publicly outlined in a paper at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit. The Saudi-owned, U.K.-based daily newspaper Al Hayat established the details of this paper in a May 5 article. The key points made in the presentation include the following:

1. Iran does not want an abrupt withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq for fear this would lead to reshuffling the cards and redistributing power. Instead, there should be a fixed timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. and British forces from Iraqi cities and relocation at bases and camps inside Iraq, provided the Iraqi forces have reached the point at which they can provide security. The Iranians also stated that they would extend all possible assistance so that foreign forces could exit "honorably" from Iraq.

The U.S. decision to surge more troops into Iraq forced Iran to think twice about placing its bets on a complete U.S. withdrawal. An abrupt withdrawal without a negotiated settlement leaves more problems than Tehran can manage in terms of containing Iraq's Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish factions, and Iran does not want to be left to pick up the pieces in a country that is already on the verge of shattering along sectarian lines.

It is important to note that Iran is not calling for a complete withdrawal from Iraq, and actually acknowledges that U.S. forces will be relocated at bases and camps inside the country. Though this acts as a blocker to Iranian ambitions, the presence of U.S. bases also provides Iran with a stabilizing force placating the Sunnis and Kurds. Moreover, the Iranians are sending assurances to the United States that they are willing to cooperate so the Iraq withdrawal does not look like another Vietnam scenario for the U.S. administration to deal with at home.

2. Iran is "strongly opposed to all attempts to partition Iraq or impose a federal system that allows for regional autonomy." No region should be allowed to monopolize the resources in its territory and deprive other regions of the revenues from these resources.

Iran is essentially saying that Tehran and Washington have a common desire to see a unified Iraq. The U.S. insistence on a unified Iraq takes into account Sunni concerns of being left with the largely oil-barren central region of the country. Iran is signaling that it is not interested in seeing Iraq get split up, even if such a scenario leaves Tehran with the second-best option of securing influence in a Shiite-dominated, oil-rich southern autonomous zone.

3. Iran wants a plan, involving the Kurds and Sunnis, drawn up to root out the transnational jihadist forces allied with al Qaeda in Iraq. Sunni tribes should also assume the responsibility of confronting jihadists, whether they are Iraqi citizens or are from other Arab and Muslim countries.

In this demand, Iran and the United States share a common goal. The jihadists will use every attempt to sow sectarian strife in Iraq to prevent a political resolution from developing. The United States does not want to provide al Qaeda with a fertile base of operations, and Iran does not want its ideological nemesis gaining ground next door and working against Shiite interests.

4. Iran clearly states that the negotiations over Iraq cannot be separated from other regional issues and Tehran's nuclear file.

Stratfor has extensively discussed the nexus between Iran's nuclear agenda and its blueprint for Iraq. Iran is trying to link the nuclear issue to its dealings with the United States on Iraq as a sort of insurance policy. Iran does not want to reach an agreement on Iraq and then leave the nuclear issue to be dealt with down the road, when the United States is in a stronger position to take action against Tehran.

Iran basically is looking for a deal allowing it voluntarily to agree to freeze uranium enrichment in exchange for political concessions over Iraq, but without it having to dismantle its program. That would leave enough room to skirt sanctions and preserve the nuclear program for its long-term interests. Washington is not exactly amenable to this idea, which is what makes this a major sticking point. The United States already has made it clear that it is leaving the nuclear issue out of the Iraq discussions.

5. Iran wants a new regional formula that would make Iraq a region of influence for Tehran.

While it does not appear that Iran explicitly stated this in its presentation, a majority of participants at the conference got the message. Washington cannot afford to allow Iraq to develop into an Iranian satellite, but it is looking for assurances from Iran that a U.S. withdrawal will leave in place a neutral, albeit Shiite-dominated, government in Iraq.

Iranian Offers

The Iranian paper outlined several key concessions it would offer the United States and Iraq's Sunni faction if its demands were met.

1. Iran would help the Iraqi government rein in the armed Shiite militias and incorporate them into the state security apparatus.

2. The de-Baathification law can be revised to allow for the rehiring of former Iraqi army personnel, the bulk of whom are tied to the Sunni nationalist insurgency. However, Iran wants assurances that former Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and other former Baathists will not be allowed to hold the position of prime minister when the time comes to replace current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

3. Iran would be willing to see fresh parliamentary elections, the formation of a new Cabinet and the amendment of the Iraqi Constitution to double the Sunni seats in parliament to 40 percent, with the Shia retaining 60 percent. Tehran has said nothing about what would be left for Kurdish political representation, however.

4. Iran has proposed the "fair" distribution of oil revenues in Iraq to satisfy all parties, especially those in "central Iraq," the Sunni-dominated, oil-deprived heart of the country.

Tehran's offers illustrate the Iranians' open acknowledgment that they are not going to be able to have their cake and eat it too. Instead, they are going to have to guarantee Iraqi neutrality by giving the Sunnis a much larger slice, leaving the Kurds to get screwed yet again.

Back in Washington, the Bush administration is looking at the Iranian withdrawal plan skeptically. Right now, the United States wants assurances that a withdrawal plan worked out with the Iranians does not simply leave a longer-term opportunity for Iran to gradually take control of Iraq once the major roadblocks are out of the way. In other words, the United States needs guarantees that, as it draws down its troop presence, the Iranians will not simply walk in. The Iranian proposal to expand Sunni representation is a direct response to these concerns, provided the relevant parties can actually deliver on their promises.

This is still highly questionable, though significant developments are already taking place that reveal the United States, Iran and various Iraqi players are making concrete moves to uphold their sides of the bargain. With Iran's blessing, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) has announced it will undergo a process of "Iraqization" -- a largely symbolic demonstration that SCIRI will not operate simply as an Iranian proxy. Meanwhile, the Sunni tribes and clans in Anbar province are increasingly broadcasting their commitment and progress in combating transnational jihadists. And finally, numerous reports in the Arab media suggest the United States would be willing to heed the Iranian demand that the Iraqi military not have offensive capabilities allowing it to threaten its Persian neighbor.

The negotiations are moving, and it is becoming more and more apparent that a consensus is emerging between Tehran and Washington over how the Iraq project should turn out. With enough serious arrestors in play for this deal to fall through, it is now up to all players -- whether those players call Washington, Tehran, Riyadh or Baghdad home -- finally to put their money where their mouths are.
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[musika man]

^^^^

irak is and the middle east is finished like somalia. civila wars started in palestine, irak and soon war will spread between shiats and sunni everywhere and winners of both sects will be fighting over which is the perfect sect, both shiats or sunni. will spread beyond the middle east, time to assemble a team to neutralize the revebarations. tsunami like violence will break. neo cons are like somalis. that is why both admire each other. time to get out of irak.

[Sadaam_Mariixmaan]

the end of Big Satan is near...

[Karbaash_killa]

Iran are asking for peace in the Midle east and Equallity threw out the world.. which the US is tryna to arm their allies with nukes and deny others which of curs is tottaly unacceptable... If USA,RUSSIA,UK AND EVEN ISRAEL are allowed to have NUKES then SO will IRAN too!

[Steeler [Crawler2]]

Iran doesn't want equality. Iran wants to export its revolution (which is, OFFICIALLY, part of its stated foreign policy) and it wants hegemony over the gulf. It bitterly resents Western global hegemony, just as you do.

[Poetess]

"Iran are asking for peace in the Midle east and Equallity threw out the world.. which the US is tryna to arm their allies with nukes and deny others which of curs is tottaly unacceptable... If USA,RUSSIA,UK AND EVEN ISRAEL are allowed to have NUKES then SO will IRAN too!"

In it's four decades of being a nuclearized state, never once has "the light unto the nations" threatened to employ them against any enemy, although from the moment of its inception as the only mideast liberal democracy, it's been under siege from its belligerent Arab neighbours.

The same is true also for the aforementioned states. Iran however, has stated its fervent desire to obliterate a UN member state from the map BEFORE it's even acquired it. Need one say more?

Iran's starting down the well-trodden path of war - and if the Mullahs insist on nukes, then there's no shortage of guys in the admin who are only too happy to give it to 'em.

[Gedo_Boy]

Wars usually bring about changes in the status quo. Just like how the US found itself after WW2 with new muscle to flex, Iran is probably thinking that the US' blunderous invasion and the ensuing Civil War in Iraq mean they will be propelled to regional hegemon. The nukes would be the icing on the cake.

Iran was probably looking at 2 case studies: North Korea and Iraq. Both of them were heavily sanctioned and military options were considered for both of them.

Iran is much more similar to North Korea in that they both have many more cards in their favor than Iraq did. In the case of North Korea, it was an already advanced nuclear program and significant conventional capabilities which. Given that Seoul is an economic powerhouse and is well within range of North Korean retaliation, the US can't really afford to do anything in the Korean peninsula without global repercussions. Add the fact that this is China's backyard and it was the Chinese forces who initially pushed the US forces back to the 38th parallel way back in the '50s, it's obvious that all the US can really do is either bribe the Koreans or let it go altogether. Besides, North Korea doesn't pose an imminent threat to Israel or the flow of oil in the Middle East.

Iraq barked when it had no bite, it really had no cards. There was nothing they could do to comply with inspections short of relinquishing control of their oil to Western companies. Since Saddam wasn't willing to do that - like any natural born survivor -trying to find a way to tough it out, sanctions were just preparing the stage for an eventual attack.

Iraq is a case in point of why leaders should have good foresight. Acording to Wolfowitz, the war was supposed to be a 'cakewalk' and would have a primary benefit in securing control of oil, with Iraq pumping to capacity again in the world and the rest of the Gulf having no economic choice but to comply w/ the demands to pump on par with Iraq, Iranian (and perhaps Venezuealan) oil production wouldn't be as critical as it is at this juncture. If their oil wasn't as important to the global economy due to compensation from Iraq & other Gulf countries, the global markets could more easily tolerate military ventures especially seeing what a little strong-arming did to the release of Iraqi oil (if it did in fact go well )

A secondary benefit of the Iraqi war should/would have been a significant force placed in Iraq from which to project force on either Iran or Syria. Although conceivably Syria is possibly still somewhat intimidated, all the Iraqi venture has done for Iran was:

1. To put in power the Shia forces who have been under Iranian patronage for so long.
2. Giving Iran another valuable deterrence card by placing over a hundred thousand troops on the ground in Iraq. It is probably not outrageous to beleive that Iraq has become pretty much field trial after field trial for Iranian Weapons Labs.


Let's find Wolfowitz a job he can handle.