The Djibouti process was built on two pillars:
1. Abdullahi Yusuf is not an Islamist so the Islamists would never support negotiations especially with the fact he was a known Ethiopian partisan.
2. Abdullahi Yusuf was not Hawiye and being one of the most visible previous Darod warlords would in fact bolster the support of the Islamist due to Hawiye clan in Mogadishu either being neutral or actively fighting against him, thereby being on the side of the Islamists.
Three men came up with these points: Ould Abdalla, Nuur Adde, Ahmed Abdisalaam.
Two things were achieved.
A Hawiye Islamist was elected with a system that was heavily biased towards him (200 new parliamentarians chosen just with the aim to have him elected without surprised on election day). It was naturally assumed him being Hawiye Islamist would result in two things:
1. Bring Hawiye civil society and clan militias on board, thereby bringing Mogadishu nominally under his control currying large support from the population there.
2. Bring the Islamists on board and at the least agree to peaceful negotiations with him a fellow ICU Islamist.
The assumptions have failed and the true dynamics have played themselves out.
Clan assumption results:
1. Clans have no more power in the dynamics of southern Somalia where a multi-clan and multi-national entity can run over any clan militia in hours as they have done in the first days of fighting in Mogadishu.
2. The Hawiye clan has no more special favors and influences in Mogadishu than the Darod or other clans in this new phenomenon of Somali politics.
Islamist assumption results:
3. The Islamist do not want peace and do not want negotiations. These are international outlaws and people who are on the wanted list of many countries. Therefore they are people saving their own back and have no interest in peace or the welfare of larger society.
4. A strong military leader must be given the top post to crush the international outlaws.
As of now, we consider the Djibouti process a flop.
