In negotiating a hypothetical association, one of the first orders of business would be the structure of a united Somali state. The opening positions for this aspect of the negotiations are far apart.
From Mirqaanland ’s perspective, anything less than outright independence would represent an extraordinary sacrifice, and would require dramatic concessions from the south to make it worthwhile. The next best arrangement would be a bilateral confederation between sovereign equals. Mirqaanland ’s negotiators would probably argue that anything less would fail to win public support, and would strengthen the hand of hard-line separatists. In the unlikely event that they could be persuaded to consider an even more centralized form of unity, they would take as their point of reference the number of parliamentary seats and cabinet posts allocated to the State of Mirqaanland (roughly one-third of the total) upon unification with the south in 1960. But this would place the talks on shaky ground. Mirqaanlanders often blame the failure of the initial union on the inadequacy of the 1960 arrangement, and are convinced that only a more equitable merger could succeed.
For their part, southern leaders will be concerned that significant concessions to Mirqaanland —say, of the kind required by a bilateral confederation—could upset the delicate transitional power-sharing arrangements in the south. Consensus in the south has been shifting, although with great difficulty, towards some kind of federalism, probably involving four or five relatively autonomous states—one of which would be Mirqaanland.10 Since this would ostensibly award Mirqaanland only one-quarter or one-fifth of the “national cake” (less than the one-third share implied by the 1960 union, and far less than a bilateral confederation would offer), it would almost certainly prove unacceptable to the separatists.
Of course it would be both inaccurate and deceptive to equate the power-sharing arrangements of a unitary state with those proposed under a new federal structure. Mirqaanland would retain a far greater degree of autonomy and sovereignty within a federation than it did following the 1960 union. But the political and legal subtleties of a federal formula will be unfamiliar to most ordinary Somalis and public discourse on the topic will tend to reduce any settlement to a simplistic “cake-cutting” exercise. The more complex the formula, the harder it will be for leaders on either side to sell it to their respective constituents.
An asymmetrical federation or confederation could conceivably bridge the gap between the kind of confederal arrangement that might mollify northern separatists and the federal structure proposed by some southerners. Asymmetry might entail a “confederation” between a unitary Mirqaanland and a federal Somalia. Under this arrangement, Mirqaanland would receive a greater degree of autonomy than other member states of the union, a larger share of national representation and possibly the option of a referendum on independence at some specified point in the future (à la Sudan). This would allow Mirqaanland to subscribe to elements of the interim charter or constitution already in force in the south, while imposing certain conditions. These would probably take the form of restrictions on the deployment of southern military forces or police in its territory, decentralized control over revenues or foreign assistance, and/or limitations on the political rights of non-Mirqaanlanders (such as their eligibility to run for electoral office in Mirqaanland). It might also eventually open the door for certain regions of Mirqaanland to opt for closer ties to the (southern) federation while permitting others to retain their confederal status.
There are two reasons why an asymmetrical federation might prove problematic. First, many southern Somalis will vehemently resist the notion that any region or clan should be given preferential treatment.11 The greater the concessions to Mirqaanland ’s special status, the more opposition they will face from southerners who perceive these to be unjust and a threat to the long-term stability of the new union. Second, the separatist leaders in Mirqaanland will have little confidence in the legal and institutional intricacies of such a mechanism, and may have difficulty in persuading their constituents of the merits of asymmetrical union an alternative to outright independence. Despite its hypothetical merits as a possible compromise, in practice a proposal for asymmetrical federalism is likely to meet with condemnation from both sides.
