Postby Sheikh-InkaarQabe » Fri Apr 11, 2008 4:53 pm
Declining economy, inherent nepotism and mass killing of civilians is what siayade barre regime achieved.
"This is concerning Somalia's economy under the late regime; the following info you might also find helpful...Good reading:
Somalia's undiversified economy fueled the establishment of a shadow economy among certain rent-seeking clans like the Marehan. When official trade in cattle and qat was shut down by trade barriers or border closings, these merchants continued trading on the black market by smuggling goods across the border and avoiding tariffs and trading licenses. This generated a substantial amount of money for them. Lee Cassanelli shows this split between private and public control of trade in Somalia:
"Perhaps because Siad Barre could never effectively capture the wealth generated by Isaaq and Mijerteen livestock exporters and qat importers - since this wealth was largely monopolized within the overseas trading networks of these diasporic clans - his government concentrated increasingly on controlling the fixed assets of land and water within the country."
Additionally, the continued decline of the "official" economy and Siad Barre's increasingly repressive politics contributed to Somalia's shadow economy and resulted in an extensive network of underground black-markets in the 80s. Dr. Jamil Mubarak, a Somali lecturer, describes these economic problems:
"A major cause of the economic crises during 1970s and 1980s was poor public financial management involving: a huge but unproductive and debt-creating public investment program; inadequate recurrent expenditures on economic and social services; excessive levels of corruption; and financial dis-intermediation"
Peter Little goes on to describe these economic problems by pointing out that imports were twice that of exports, 70% of the national budget was based on foreign aid and the currency declined from 37 shillings to the dollar in 1983 to 1,500 shillings to the dollar in 1989. Little summarizes this by stating, "Starting in the mid-1980s, the national economy went from bad to worse."
It is important to note that this economic decline was only in the national, state-run economy. These difficult conditions forced people to engage in unofficial trading in order to survive. The shadow economy developed out of necessity, and when rent-seeking groups realized how profitable it was, they drove the economy into "partial reform," as explained by John Hellman. By smuggling qat and cattle across the border to Kenya, and trading small arms among various Somali clans and to resistance fighters in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, private entrepreneurs, who were often connected with Siad Barre's regime, generated an immense amount of wealth while some trickled down to the masses.
Domestic Policy Failure and Land Seizure
As the economic situation became increasingly dire and recurrent draughts continued to strain the country, Siad Barre's rule came to be marked by ruthless suppression of dissidents, mass jailing, bombing of civilian targets, and indiscriminate use of landmines. Instead of increasing his control over a steadily fragmenting nation, Barre's "Reign of Terror" only succeeded in fueling popular opposition and worsening ongoing clan warfare. During this time, political and economic risk takers saw it as an opportunity to forcefully displace minority Rahanweyn, Digil, and Bantu by seizing their land in the fertile Shabelle and Juba River Valleys. Alex de Waal describes this time of land-grabbing:
"The Rahanweyn, Digil, and Bantu faced great difficulties in registering the land they had cultivated for generations; Marehan kinsman of Siad Barre and other powerful groups were able to register large tracts of land with ease. If these lands were already cultivated, then the existing farmers were frequently forced off at gunpoint."
When Siad Barre kinsman and other powerful groups seized land in Somalia's "bread basket," they had no intention to continue cultivation. The seizure was only for personal economic gain. This broke down the traditional trade between farmers and pastoralists, because now pastoralists had nothing to exchange their goods for since large tracts of fertile land were not producing crops. Michel Chossudovsky states, "The entire social fabric of the pastoralist economy was undone." Furthermore, displaced farmers, disrupted trade, and draught set the stage for a famine of staggering proportions that claimed 300,000 lives by 1992. Another 1.5 million were in danger of dying, 30,000 died from clan warfare, and 1 million became refugees by fleeing to Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen."
Facts always beat opinion
