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Barre Adan Shire ‘Hiiraale’ and Hassan Galad
24. Former leaders of the now defunct JVA, notably Barre Adan Shire ‘Hiiraale’ (Darod /
Marehan) and Hassan Galad (Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Ayr), have been instrumental in the
Government’s planning of the March 2013 deployment of Darod / Marehan forces to a position 40
kilometers from Kismayo.30 Approximately 200 forces were dispatched from the town of El Waak
and were funded by officials in the office of Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon (Darod / Marehan).31
25. From El Waak the force passed through roughly a dozen Al-Shabaab checkpoints on its way
towards Kismayo without any resistance.32 A key broker between these forces and Al-Shabaab was
Abdurahman Filow33 (Darod / Marehan), a former commander under Hiiraale’s JVA and who was a
senior Al-Shabaab commander in Kismayo before being expelled by KDF and Ras Kamboni forces in
September 2012. Moreover, the Al-Shabaab ally, Mohamed Wali Sheikh Ahmed Nuur (Darod /
Marehan) (profiled in S/2011/433, paragraphs 320 and 321), guaranteed unopposed passage for the
El Waak force through Al-Shabaab-controlled territory.34
26. While Filow has recently allied with officials in the FGS, he has continued to operate as an
Al-Shabaab commander, leading recruitment drives in Jamaame in March 2013, and organising an
Al-Shabaab attack on Kismayo on 4 April 2013, in which militants fired four explosive projectiles
between the old airport and the city university.35 Hiiraale, meanwhile, relocated in late April 2013
from Mogadishu to Kismayo with a detachment of personal militia and has proclaimed himself as the
president of a new regional government of Jubaland.
Foot notes
30 A Somali Government official told the Monitoring Group on 1 March 2013 that Hiiraale and
Galad had arrived in Mogadishu to ‘seek the reactivation’ of the JVA through FGS support. A
separate Somali government official told the Monitoring Group on 15 March 2013 that the march on
Kismayo was coordinated through the Office of the Prime Minister, and involved Hiiraale and
Galad.
31 Interview with Somali Government official with access to the planning discussions, 15 March
2013.
32 Ibid., and corroborated by two diplomatic security sources and a Marehan source with access to
Hiiraale’s entourage, 11 April 2013.
33 Ibid. According to confidential military intelligence reports, during the course of late 2012 and
2013, Filow has negotiated with the FGS to convert Darod – Marehan Al-Shabaab fighters into
government-aligned forces within the ranks of ASWJ. Military intelligence reports state that Filow
was once a commander of Hiiraale’s and was involved in plans to stage hit-and-run attacks against
Kismayo following Al-Shabaab’s retreat from the city in September 2012. Military intelligence
reports him as having attempted to integrate Marehan forces into ASWJ.
34 Information provided by Somali Government official with access to planning discussions,
15 March 2013, and by Marehan sources with access to government circles. A separate Somali
government official informed the Monitoring Group that Ahmed Nuur had been in discussions with
Hiiraale prior to the 6 March 2013 attack to commit political support from his Marehan allies in
Gedo region.
35 Information of Filow’s continuing involvement documented in several confidential military
intelligence reports during early 2013. Details of 4 April 2013 attack on Kismayo provided by
military intelligence officer, 2 May 2013.
___
27. According to a source in direct contact with Ahmed Nuur and Abdi Wal, both men consider
themselves to be part of the same alliance, and have worked with Hiiraale to pressure FGS officials to
integrate more Marehan and Ayr elements into Somali security forces.36 In addition, Hassan Galad
appears to be merging his forces with militias loyal to Gobale and Indha’adde in the Merka-Afgoye
axis.37 These are clear indications that Hiiraale and Galad, who once spearheaded the JVA, are
connecting with spoiler networks from the Ayr clan, as described above.
Support from Eritrea
28. The Monitoring Group has received numerous reports about the warming of relations between
Asmara and Mogadishu, and has obtained evidence of Asmara’s control of political agents close to
the Somali Presidency and some of the individual spoilers referred to above.
29. A key foreign policy advisor to President Hassan Sheikh is Ahmed Abdi Hashi ‘Hashara’, a
former leader within ARS-Asmara who is known to have received financial support from Asmara at
least as late as 2012.38 In 2012, Hashara described General Jama Mohamed Ghalib, referred to above,
as his political ally and announced his intent to create a new accord between the FGS and former
members of ARS-Asmara.39
30. The Monitoring Group has obtained direct testimonies and concrete evidence of Eritrean
support to Abdi Wal and Mohamed Wali Sheikh Ahmed Nuur. A source on the Eritrean payroll in
direct contact with Abdi Wal has confirmed that Abdi Wal has admitted in closed-door meetings and
that he is acting as an agent for the Eritrean government.40 General Ghalib has referred to Ahmed
Nuur as a key ally of his.41
31. In addition to these testimonies, the Monitoring Group has confirmed meetings in Khartoum
in late December 2012 between Ahmed Nuur and Mohamed Mantai, the Eritrean Ambassador to
Sudan. During these meetings, options for Eritrean financial support to Ahmed Nuur were discussed.42 Telephone records of Ahmed Nuur’s Somali telephone number also show direct contact
with a landline in Eritrea.
32. Mantai, a former military intelligence officer, has a history of operating in Somalia and was
expelled from Kenya in 2009 after he returned from Somalia following meetings with Al-Shabaab
agents (see S/2011/433, annex 8.5). Additional information about Mantai, and Eritrean support to
Somali spoiler networks appears in the separate Eritrea report of the Monitoring Group report on
Somalia and Eritrea.
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