Annex 3.2: Spoiler networks in central Somalia
1. The east-central region of Somalia is fraught with attempts to subvert the fragile
leadership of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in a manner consistent with a broader
trend across the ‘liberated’ parts of the country. Key to this subversive tendency is the entity of
Galmudug and its warlord-turned-president Colonel Abdi Hassan Awale ‘Qeybdiid’. As
Galmudug is becoming increasingly unstable, conditions of insecurity now seem to extend into
the regional state of Puntland. Qeybdiid appropriated political power through alleged
intimidation, clan manipulation and force, presided over a yearlong political crisis, and is
attempting to consolidate his power base through allies in the new government in Mogadishu.
‘Qeybdiid’
2. Abdi Hassan Awale ‘Qeybdiid’ (Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Sa’ad) is often described as a
“former” warlord who fought against the United Nations peacekeeping operation and U.S.
forces in Somalia during the early 1990s.1
In October 2005, the Swedish newspaper Svenska
Dagbladet linked Qeybdiid to an incriminating video showing executions of young boys in the
Lower Juba town of Kismayo while he was the chief of police.2
Qeybdiid as a “former”
warlord still retains close ties to other “former” warlords and current spoilers, including the
Eritrean agent of influence Abdi Nur Siad ‘Abdi Wal’, a fellow Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Ayr
clansman who is reported to have a close relationship with a senior Al-Shabaab commander
(see annex 3.3 for more on Abdi Wal).3
3. Qeybdiid, while politically and militarily more active in the east-central region,
continues to have an exploitive relationship with the government in Mogadishu and is therefore
viewed by the Monitoring Group as a potential threat to peace and security. Recently in May
2013, uncorroborated reports from African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) security
officials indicated Qeybdiid had threatened to redeploy his 300 militiamen from Mogadishu if
the FGS failed to meet his political demands.4
However, due to Qeybdiid’s new power base and
the pressure of competing militias in the east-central region, the Monitoring Group assesses
that Qeybdiid’s militiamen in Mogadishu are likely to be no more than 100 in number but still
able to undermine the FGS in the capital city.
Political instability
4. Qeybdiid has begun focusing more on Galmudug from 2011 to 2012 on the pretext of
resolving the political and security crisis that was plaguing the administration of the former
President, Mohamed Ahmed Alin. More likely, the shift in his attention was a reaction to his
waning influence in Mogadishu.5
5. In spite of the Mogadishu Government’s effective recognition of Galmudug as a
political entity,6
the ‘single clan project’ fails to meet the constitutional requirement for two or
more states to form a regional authority and it continues to face calls for disbandment.7
Galmudug was formed in August 2006 as a pragmatic solution to the Mogadishu-centric era of
warlords. Paradoxically, however, Galmudug is based on a fundamentally Habar Gedir / Sa’ad
clan settlement, and in August 2012, experienced the return to prominence of a Sa’ad / Hilowe
warlord, Qeybdiid, who, at the time, was unable to exert full and effective control over
Galgadud and Mudug.
6. In July 2012, a political crisis engulfed Galmudug following a disagreement over the
Presidential term of then President Mohamed Ahmed Alin, also a member of the Habar Gedir /
Sa’ad clan. Ahmed Alin and his supporters claimed his term was due to end in February 2013.
In opposition, a faction led by then Vice-President Abdisamad Nur Guled (Habar Gedir /
Sa’ad), backed by Qeybdiid, maintained that Ahmed Alin’s term should expire on 31 July 2012,
necessitating new presidential elections in August 2012. In essence, the dispute was over the
interpretation of the constitution and legal authority of the nine-member electoral commission
to call new elections.8
However, the crisis appears to have been influenced by Qeybdiid in his
bid to offset his loss of influence in Mogadishu, where he still retained an armed presence.9
7. On 1 August 2012, under unclear circumstances, and while the incumbent president
Ahmed Alin was out of the country, Qeybdiid was elected president of Galmudug.10 Almost
immediately, a former Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) official, Mohamud Abdi Elmi, was
declared president by a “new” electoral commission apparently endorsed by Ahmed Alin as the
outgoing president.11 Elmi was also from the Habar Gedir / Sa’ad / Sinole clan and his power
base drawn from the clan militias that formed ASWJ in the Galgadud and Gedo regions.
8. Since the ‘election’ of Galmudug’s two contending presidents, the sub-clans of Qeybdiid
and Mohamud Elmi, the Sa’ad / Hilowe and Sa’ad / Sinole respectively, as well as other clans
supporting one or the other group, have been embroiled in periodic clashes. In most cases these
outbreaks were instigated by the larger militias affiliated with Qeybdiid.12 According to
testimony from a member of the Sa’ad / Sinole sub-clan, clashes have erupted over issues such
as competing claims to the right of ‘taxation’ at illegal checkpoints effectively manned by
militias under the control of Qeybdiid.13 Such illegal checkpoints can levy up to 500 USD
under the guise of ‘taxation’.14
9. More troubling still are reports that members of Al-Shabaab may have exploited at
various times checkpoints manned by Qeybdiid’s and other militias. In 2012, as Al-Shabaab
began to suffer military reverses throughout southern Somalia, it pushed northwards, including
passing through Galmudug.15 On 20 November 2012, the Dagaari checkpoint in Galmudug,
manned by militia loyal to Qeybdiid, had routinely provided individuals believed to be
members of Al-Shabaab with safe passage.16
Extending instability into Puntland
10. Despite the ongoing dispute between Qeybdiid and Mohamud Elmi over control of
Galmudug, the FGS ostensibly recognizes Qeybdiid, as do the regional authorities of
Puntland.17 However, the Monitoring Group continues to receive numerous reports of
criminality and a destabilizing influence that Qeybdiid’s ‘leadership’ in Galmudug is having on
Puntland to the north. In the last eleven months, the lack of formal structures, public
accountability and effective governance has enabled Qeybdiid’s Galmudug to pose a potentially
increasing security threat to its neighbour. Examples corroborated by independent sources have
included the following:
• December 2012: On 7 December 2012, unknown elements from Galmudug carried out a
3-mortar attack against the Garsoor and Israa neighbourhoods in Puntland. According to
the Puntland Deputy Police Commissioner, General Muhiyadin Ahmed Mussa, the
attacks were: “on homes, on travellers and civilians.”18
• April 2013: On 21 April 2013, during a serious security breach, armed residents of
Galmudug were stopped and one was shot and killed after attempting to enter Galkayo
airport by force. The following day, unknown elements from Galmudug fired with antiaircraft weapons targeting a descending plane at Galkayo airport. Following the
incident, 3 mortars were again launched from Galmudug towards north Galkayo hitting,
according to sources, residential homes.19
Relations with Mogadishu
11. At the time of writing, Qeybdiid’s relations with Mogadishu are further deteriorating in
spite of the support from his FGS allies, including Foreign Affairs Minister Fawzia Yusuf Haji
Adan and Interior and National Security Minister Abdikarim Hussien Guled.20 Qeybdiid’s
estranged relations with Mogadishu were also apparent following an official visit of Somali
Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon Saaid to Puntland and Galmudug on 14 March 2013. The
next day, Qeybdiid’s administration issued a statement accusing the FGS of undermining
Galmudug’s right to development.21 Qeybdiid’s actions as a warlord-spoiler if not addressed
politically will continue to undermine the ability of the FGS to extend its control across
liberated areas in south central Somalia.
Annex 3.3: Spoiler networks in southern Somalia
Co-option efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia
1. In order to extend its limited authority the FGS has engaged in co-opting a number of
Al-Shabaab leaders, clan warlords and political agents once allied with Hassan Dahir Aweys
(Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Ayr), the former leader of the now defunct Alliance for the ReLiberation of Somalia-Eritrea (ARS-Asmara). Aweys became chairman of Hizbul Islam, of
which ARS-Asmara was a constituent part, and which was eventually absorbed by Al-Shabaab
in December 2010. At present, he is still part of Al-Shabaab’s military infrastructure and has
already been sanctioned by the UN Security Council.1
2. The Government of Qatar has facilitated FGS co-option efforts. Qatar played an
important role in funding the election campaign of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (see
annex 5.1) and continues to be a key financial and political partner of the FGS. In particular,
Qatar has facilitated negotiations between the FGS and Aweys. Doha also hosted President
Hassan Sheikh on 3 and 5 March 2013, when FGS representatives met Al-Shabaab delegates
for talks brokered by Sheikh Omar Iman Abubakar, the first chairman of Hizbul Islam. The
attendees included representatives of Al-Shabaab commander Mukhtar Robow.2
3. These negotiations have broadly coincided with the return to Mogadishu of a number of
high profile former ARS-Asmara officials, including Zakaria Mohamed Haji Abdi (former
deputy chairman of ARS-Asmara) and General Jama Mohamed Ghalib (formerly Hizbul Islam
liaison officer in Eritrea and from the Isaaq clan). The Monitoring Group has also observed a
strengthening of links between the FGS and a number of disaffected Hawiye / Habar Gedir /
Ayr warlords and political figures involved in acts that constitute a threat to peace and security.
The Ayr sub-clan was at one point the backbone of the Islamic Courts Union that governed
much of southern Somalia until it was routed by Ethiopian forces in December 2006.
4. In addition, the FGS has begun a process of co-opting former clan warlords who have
demonstrated growing hostility to the formation of a regional government in Jubaland and who were
part of the former Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) that controlled Kismayo between 1999 and 2006. The
core leadership of the JVA had been drawn from the Darod / Marehan and Hawiye / Habar Gedir /
Ayr clans.
Political and clan tensions
5. Since late September 2012, the FGS has encountered considerable resistance from the Ras
Kamboni forces of Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Madobe’ (Darod / Ogaden clan), who helped oust
Al-Shabaab from Kismayo and then, with Kenyan military support, established his own political and
armed presence in the area. In particular, since October 2012, the explicit instructions of President
Hassan Sheikh to AMISOM to keep the port of Kismayo closed and prevent the export of charcoal
have been consistently flouted and FGS officials have not been granted full access to the port or the
city generally (see annex 9 on violations of the UN Security Council charcoal ban).3
Indeed,
successive FGS delegations to Kismayo have been prevented from leaving the airport by the Kenya
Defence Forces (KDF) contingent of AMISOM and Madobe’s Ras Kamboni. The refusal of Ras
Kamboni to integrate into official Somali security institutions has led the FGS to view Ras Kamboni
as a spoiler clan militia operating outside the purview of the national constitution and constituting,
therefore, a threat to peace and security.4
6. Clan tensions in Kismayo have been particularly acute between Darod / Ogaden fighters of
Ras Kamboni and Darod / Marehan soldiers within the official ranks of the Somali National Army
(SNA). On 20 December 2012, growing animosity culminated in a fire fight between both sides over
the control of a checkpoint, which killed eight people.5
On 23 February 2013, clan motivated fighting
broke out again in Kismayo when Darod / Marehan forces attempted to break free an inmate at
Kismayo’s central police station who had been arrested by Darod / Ogaden Ras Kamboni forces and
AMISOM for allegedly harbouring an illegal arms cache and for having ties to Al-Shabaab. At least
11 individuals were reported killed.6
7. In the first week of March 2013, approximately 200 Darod / Marehan fighters under the
command of the SNA attempted to enter Kismayo as a show of force, but eventually deployed
40 kilometres from the outskirts of the city7
(see below for more on this operation). While this
deployment was part of an official military operation sanctioned by the FGS, it also provided cover to
Darod / Marehan clan militia attempting to reinforce their military presence around Kismayo. The
deployment occurred as the Monitoring Group confirmed connections between individual Hawiye /
Habar Gedir / Ayr spoilers, who are complicit in acts that constitute a threat to peace and security, and
Darod / Marehan networks involved in resisting the formation of a regional government of Jubaland.
8. The FGS and local clan leaders have also been unable to agree on a constitutional process that
would satisfy all political factions in Jubaland and which could lead to the establishment of a
functional regional government with political agreements in place for revenue and power sharing
between the FGS and local authorities.8
Amid a breakdown in political talks, and in the context of
escalating clan tensions, Madobe proclaimed himself president of Jubaland on 15 May 2013. The
same day Barre Adan Shire ‘Hiiraale’, a Darod / Marehan warlord and former leader of the JVA, also
proclaimed himself president of Jubaland, setting the stage for a potential conflict.9
Since then, at
least three other politicians have since declared themselves rightful president of Jubaland. Hiiraale has
stationed himself in Kismayo since late April 2013, having arrived from Mogadishu with a
detachment of his personal militia.
Individual spoilers and threats to peace and security
9. The Monitoring Group is concerned that narrow clan and individual interests may override
FGS attempts to reconcile warring factions, break up Al-Shabaab and extend a balanced authority
over regional administrations. In particular, there are two core groups of spoilers, one aligned against
the FGS and one largely aligned in favour of the FGS. The key spoiler in opposition to the FGS is
Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Madobe’ (Darod / Ogaden). Spoilers broadly aligned with the FGS
include Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Ayr warlords and their allies in the Darod / Marehan network of Barre
Hiiraale. Each of these spoiler groups has interests that intersect with Al-Shabaab. Individual spoilers
and actions constituting threats to peace and security are identified below and in a link analysis chart
that appears at Annex 3.3.a.
Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Madobe’
10. Sheikh Ahmed Madobe has been a pivotal figure amid several years of inter-clan fighting for
control of Kismayo. As a member of the now defunct Islamic Courts Union, he ousted Hiiraale’s JVA
from Kismayo in 2006 and established military control of the city until the Islamic Courts Union were
routed by the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and he fled Kismayo in January 2007.
11. Madobe’s forces returned to Kismayo in August 2008, when Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam
recaptured the city following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. In 2009, Madobe’s
Ras Kamboni brigade split in two. Fighters loyal to Hassan Abdullah Hersi ‘Al-Turki’ joined
Al-Shabaab to defeat Madobe’s residual force and expel him from Kismayo.
12. While Sheikh Ahmed Madobe has been a key ally in AMISOM’s military campaign to expel
Al-Shabaab from Kismayo in 2012, his refusal to integrate his troops into the SNA, and his explicit
policy of exporting charcoal sourced from Al-Shabaab-controlled territory through Kismayo, has
undermined his claim of being a stabilizing force in southern Somalia. FGS officials assert that
revenues generated from the charcoal trade have enabled Madobe to expand his private arsenal
allowing him to effectively exert, with KDF support, military control over Kismayo and embezzle
public sector revenues, notably from the port.10
Yusuf Mohamed Siyaad ‘Indha’adde’
13. A key spoiler amongst disaffected Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Ayr warlords is Yusuf Mohamed
Siyaad ‘Indha’adde’, formerly the Eritrean-backed chief of defence for ARS-Asmara before joining
the armed forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).11 Indha’adde is no longer part of the
official military structure of the SNA but controls at least 300 militiamen, many of whom are
integrated within the SNA 3rd Brigade that occupies territory outside Mogadishu and Merka and along
the Afgoye corridor.12
14. The 3rd Brigade is principally drawn from the Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Ayr clan. It consists of
approximately 840 men and is between 30 and 50 per cent smaller than the other five brigades that
secure the Banadir region. General Mohamed Roble Jimale ‘Gobale’ (Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Ayr), a
close associate of Indha’adde, officially controls the 3rd Brigade.13
15. According to military intelligence reports, and sources with access to its chain of command,
territory under the control of the 3rd Brigade, particularly in the Afgoye corridor, has been heavily
infiltrated by Al-Shabaab. Also, 3rd Brigade elements have repeatedly been involved in setting up
illegal checkpoints and harassing civilians, including raping women. During the course of 2012, the
3
rd Brigade has engaged in skirmishes with at least one other SNA brigade (6th Brigade).
16. Furthermore, the Monitoring Group has obtained information detailing the complicity of
3
rd Brigade elements in the assassination of SNA commander General Mohamed Ibrahim Farah
‘Gordon’, who was shot in the head during an ambush of his convoy that was heading from Merka
towards Afgoye on 28 October 2012.14 Two eyewitness sources testified to the Monitoring Group
that Gordon was assassinated by 3rd Brigade elements and not Al-Shabaab.15 In addition, two sources
told the Monitoring Group that Gobale had disagreements with Gordon three days before his death
when Gordon proposed an operation to attack the position of Hassan Dahir Aweys.16
17. While the Monitoring Group has been unable to obtain corroborating evidence of these
allegations, it has obtained an official account of a raid by AMISOM on a farm on the road between
Merka and Afgoye on 29 October 2012. During the raid, AMISOM troops recovered an illegal arms
cache, including a rocket launcher and a sniper telescope. The farm manager was interrogated by
AMISOM troops and admitted that the cache belonged to Indha’adde. On 3 November 2012,
Indha’adde arrived at the farm with 30 troops and demanded the return of the arms cache.17
18. The Monitoring Group has obtained direct eyewitness testimony documenting a meeting
between Indha’adde and Kamal Hassan Gutale (Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Suleiman), the Chief of Staff of
President Hassan Sheikh, in the Presidency in January 2013.18 The meeting was brokered by Sheikh
Abdulkadir Ali Omar (Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Suleiman), the former TFG interior minister cited by
numerous diplomats and associates as having a role in the kidnapping of two French security officials
in 2009.19 During the course of the meeting, Gutale and Indha’adde discussed options for FGS
support to clan fighters loyal to Indha’adde,20 indicative of close relations between certain officials in
the FGS and the 3rd Brigade, notwithstanding the reported security incidents above.
Abdi Nur Siad ‘Abdi Wal’
19. Abdi Nur Siad ‘Abdi Wal’ is a Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Ayr warlord who co-founded the
Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, a group of warlords that fought and was
defeated by the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. However, Abdi Wal is now a close ally of former
ARS-Asmara leader Zakaria Mohamed Haji Abdi, for whom he provides security in Mogadishu.21 He
is known to command the allegiance of about 100 fighters in Mogadishu, and is involved in contract
killings.22 In addition, he commands the allegiance of an unknown number of Ayr fighters amongst
the ranks of ASWJ.23
20. The Monitoring Group has received credible testimony that Abdi Wal is connected to piracy
and Al-Shabaab networks and has corroborated this through analysis of his telephone records.24 The
Monitoring Group has also received credible reports of Abdi Wal’s involvement in an attack on
Mogadishu International Airport on 1 November 2012, in which an RPG was fired on AMISOM
containers.25
21. Abdi Wal claims in closed-door meetings that he is a close ally of Mahad Mohamed Ali
“Karate”, a senior Al-Shabaab intelligence officer from the Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Ayr clan.26 In two
separate closed-door meetings, Abdi Wal stated that he was part of a plan to win back political power
for former members of the Islamic Courts Union and to create instability in Mogadishu until more
Ayr are appointed to positions in the FGS.27
22. Both Abdi Wal and his political godfather, another former warlord, Mohamud Afrah
Qanyare28 (Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Murosade), have regular contacts with officials in the Somali
Presidency and have demanded a greater share of weapons for Hawiye / Habar Gedir clan fighters,
warning the Government not to give favourable treatment to Hawiye / Abgaal armed units.29
23. This account coincides with separate reports that Abdi Wal and other Ayr figures may be
important allies of FGS-aligned Darod / Marehan leaders who have been involved in building up the
Darod / Marehan armed presence around Kismayo.
Barre Adan Shire ‘Hiiraale’ and Hassan Galad
24. Former leaders of the now defunct JVA, notably Barre Adan Shire ‘Hiiraale’ (Darod /
Marehan) and Hassan Galad (Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Ayr), have been instrumental in the
Government’s planning of the March 2013 deployment of Darod / Marehan forces to a position 40
kilometers from Kismayo.30 Approximately 200 forces were dispatched from the town of El Waak
and were funded by officials in the office of Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon (Darod / Marehan).31
25. From El Waak the force passed through roughly a dozen Al-Shabaab checkpoints on its way
towards Kismayo without any resistance.32 A key broker between these forces and Al-Shabaab was
Abdurahman Filow33 (Darod / Marehan), a former commander under Hiiraale’s JVA and who was a
senior Al-Shabaab commander in Kismayo before being expelled by KDF and Ras Kamboni forces in
September 2012. Moreover, the Al-Shabaab ally, Mohamed Wali Sheikh Ahmed Nuur (Darod /
Marehan) (profiled in S/2011/433, paragraphs 320 and 321), guaranteed unopposed passage for the
El Waak force through Al-Shabaab-controlled territory.34
26. While Filow has recently allied with officials in the FGS, he has continued to operate as an
Al-Shabaab commander, leading recruitment drives in Jamaame in March 2013, and organising an
Al-Shabaab attack on Kismayo on 4 April 2013, in which militants fired four explosive projectiles
between the old airport and the city university.35 Hiiraale, meanwhile, relocated in late April 2013
from Mogadishu to Kismayo with a detachment of personal militia and has proclaimed himself as the
president of a new regional government of Jubaland.
According to a source in direct contact with Ahmed Nuur and Abdi Wal, both men consider
themselves to be part of the same alliance, and have worked with Hiiraale to pressure FGS officials to
integrate more Marehan and Ayr elements into Somali security forces.36 In addition, Hassan Galad
appears to be merging his forces with militias loyal to Gobale and Indha’adde in the Merka-Afgoye
axis.37 These are clear indications that Hiiraale and Galad, who once spearheaded the JVA, are
connecting with spoiler networks from the Ayr clan, as described above.
Support from Eritrea
28. The Monitoring Group has received numerous reports about the warming of relations between
Asmara and Mogadishu, and has obtained evidence of Asmara’s control of political agents close to
the Somali Presidency and some of the individual spoilers referred to above.
29. A key foreign policy advisor to President Hassan Sheikh is Ahmed Abdi Hashi ‘Hashara’, a
former leader within ARS-Asmara who is known to have received financial support from Asmara at
least as late as 2012.38 In 2012, Hashara described General Jama Mohamed Ghalib, referred to above,
as his political ally and announced his intent to create a new accord between the FGS and former
members of ARS-Asmara.39
30. The Monitoring Group has obtained direct testimonies and concrete evidence of Eritrean
support to Abdi Wal and Mohamed Wali Sheikh Ahmed Nuur. A source on the Eritrean payroll in
direct contact with Abdi Wal has confirmed that Abdi Wal has admitted in closed-door meetings and
that he is acting as an agent for the Eritrean government.40 General Ghalib has referred to Ahmed
Nuur as a key ally of his.41
31. In addition to these testimonies, the Monitoring Group has confirmed meetings in Khartoum
in late December 2012 between Ahmed Nuur and Mohamed Mantai, the Eritrean Ambassador to
Sudan. During these meetings, options for Eritrean financial support to Ahmed Nuur were
discussed.42 Telephone records of Ahmed Nuur’s Somali telephone number also show direct contact
with a landline in Eritrea.
32. Mantai, a former military intelligence officer, has a history of operating in Somalia and was
expelled from Kenya in 2009 after he returned from Somalia following meetings with Al-Shabaab
agents (see S/2011/433, annex 8.5). Additional information about Mantai, and Eritrean support to
Somali spoiler networks appears in the separate Eritrea report of the Monitoring Group report on
Somalia and Eritrea.
Annex 3.4: Spoiler networks and the Somali security services
1. A key asset for both Al-Shabaab and former officials within the TFG is Artan Abdi
Ibrahim ‘Bidar’ (Hawiye / Murosade / Sebdi / Abubakar), a known security consultant in
Mogadishu who has provided private security protection for Government officials but who has
been also identified by senior security officials as an agent for Al-Shabaab.
2. A senior ranking security official, TFG Minister and FGS official have all identified the
role of Artan Bidar, a cousin and close confidant of Sheikh ‘Ali Dheere’, the spokesman of
Al-Shabaab with whom he works closely.1
These and other sources have also identified Artan
Bidar as a private security contractor who has worked for TFG former President Sheikh Sharif
Sheikh Ahmed, TFG former Speaker of Parliament Sheikh Sharif Hassan Aden, former TFG
Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed ‘Farmajo’2
, and General Abdullahi Gaafow
Mohamud, the Director of Immigration and Naturalization at Mogadishu International Airport.
Artan Bidar is also the cousin and intimate associate of Mohamed Moalim Hassan, the former
Director of the TFG Presidency (Chief of Cabinet), who helped facilitate his activities.
3. Since mid-2012, Artan Bidar has been under investigation by a number of security
officials in Somalia for the alleged assassination of at least several individuals in Mogadishu.
In addition to a journalist writing about corruption in the TFG and a comedian who talked
about wealthy politicians giving their money to the poor, these include the following two cases,
amongst others.3
4. First, on 19 July 2012, unknown assailants gunned down Mohamed Ali Hussein, the
Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Finance. While Al-Shabaab was blamed for the
attack, press reports suggested that the motive for the killing was the victim’s cooperation with
the Monitoring Group in providing sensitive information about TFG corruption.4
Investigators
subsequently confirmed to the Monitoring Group that the motive was related to the perception
that the victim, previously an official at the Central Bank, had denied to the Monitoring Group
Sharif Hassan’s claim that he had deposited a 10 million USD payment into the Central Bank.
5. Second, in the evening of 4 August 2012, with a similar modus operandi, unknown
assailants armed with pistols gunned down Ibrahim Iman Halane, the general manager of
Mogadishu airport. While Al-Shabaab again was blamed for the attack, investigators
subsequently confirmed to the Monitoring Group that the motive for the killing was the
allegation that Halane had provided information to the Monitoring Group about Sharif Hassan
diverting taxation revenue from the airport.
According to Somali security officials investigating these cases, Artan Bidar has 25 to
30 armed men working for him. These include a trusted lieutenant, Fathi Sheikh Muhudin
(Hawiye / Karanle), who is also a close associate of both Sheikh Sharif and Sharif Hassan.
Muhudin is responsible for running a team of 10 hit men. Reportedly, one of these men,
“Ahmed” (Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Suleiman), led the assassination of the airport manager,
Halane. The arrested hit men say they are paid 200 USD after successfully killing someone,
20 USD for surveillance and 5 USD in telephone credits. In addition to independently
providing assassins for contract killings, Artan Bidar coordinates with Al-Shabaab hit squads
through family connections with Ali Dheere.5
7. The Monitoring Group has not obtained irrefutable evidence of the involvement of
Artan Badar in any specific murder, but has received consistent testimony that he remains a
‘gun-for-hire’ and an agent involved in infiltrating Al-Shabaab agents into the National
Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), under the cover of acting as informants against
Al-Shabaab.
8. In addition, more than 200 Al-Shabaab prisoners seem to have been released on the
instructions of former TFG President Sheikh Sharif and former TFG Interior and Security
Minister Abdisamad Moalim Mohamud in late August 2012.6
Two senior Somali security
officials have told the Monitoring Group that two of the suicide bombers involved in the attack
on the Jazira Hotel in Mogadishu on 12 September 2012, when President Hassan Sheikh was
addressing his first press conference as President, were former prisoners who had been released
in August.7
9. While the Monitoring Group could not verify the veracity of these claims, it has
nonetheless obtained first hand eyewitness testimony from a Somali speaking individual
present at the Jazira hotel on 12 September 2012. This individual overheard Somali police
deployed inside the hotel discussing the entry plan of the second suicide bomber, who was
eventually shot dead by a ministerial security officer that was not part of the police
deployment.8
10. Furthermore, and according to reports from Somali security officials, Ahmed Moallim
Fiqi, who stepped down as director of NISA on 25 March 2013, and Al-Shabaab enjoy a close
relationship. Senior TFG officials have voiced concerns that Fiqi used Al-Shabaab agents to
target political opponents within the government.9
One senior security official that worked
with Fiqi informed the Monitoring Group that several Al-Shabaab suspects he arrested claimed
to be working as agents for Fiqi.10
11. While Al-Shabaab defectors are used regularly to gather information by intelligence
agencies in Somalia, there are grounds for concern that Al-Shabaab and other spoiler networks
may have leveraged entry points into NISA, where they have succeeded in gathering
intelligence on NISA operations or positioning themselves to exploit political disputes at the
heart of Government in Somalia.
12. As such, the Monitoring Group notes with concern the attempted theft of a number of
mortar rounds from an arms and ammunition storage facility operated by NISA in Mogadishu
on 15 March 2013. Two sources confirmed that security guards on duty at Villa Somalia
arrested an individual attempting to smuggle out a number of mortar rounds from the NISA
armoury on that day. One media report estimated as many as eleven mortar rounds were
captured by the security guards, and suggested that subsequent Government investigations
revealed a significant leak in NISA’s armoury.11
