The Marehan were undoubtedly the strongest Somali clan in
the region of the Juba/Daua confluence. In fact they were the
only people who successfully defied the threat of Ethiopian
hostility. About March 1905 some 600 Ethiopians under Wolde,
and accompanied by Geydu, visited El Wak and Muddo Arele. Geydu
had been brought to point out the limits of his country and when,
on the edge of Garre territory, the Ethiopians threatened the
Marehan, the latter sent back a bow and poisoned arrow. This
was a challenge to fight and the Amhara wisely chose to ignore it.
But not having suffered from Ethiopian aggression, the Marehan
saw no reason to welcome the advent of Zaphiro's inspectorate
on the frontier, while their dominant position on the upper Juba
went hand in hand with a refusal to acknowledge any superior
authority.
Thus the Marehan were the only people along the border over
whom Zaphiro did not gain some control. Consequently his attitude
towards them was unfavorable:
They are all fanatics; they never paid tribute either to
the Abyssinians or to the British Government ... from
these tribes we shall have some trouble for the first
few years until the British Government has made some
4
Salkeld to Dep. Comm. Mombasa, 15 July 1905, CO.533/3*
453
arrangements for checking them*
And the necessity to check them became particularly apparent
as inter-tribal raiding increased.
In the first place, the growing lawlessness on the frontier
was largely attributed to the Marehan. A cycle of retaliatory
raiding was set in motion and as a result skirmishes became
endemic. The Garre, the Aulihan and the Marehan were all involved
2
in raids. Relations between the Marehan and those Somali clans
that were trying to force their way into the British Protectorate
was also at times particularly bitter. Thus there were violent
clashes between the Marehan and the Digodia in the north and between the Marehan and the Rer Afgab Aulihan to the east. Although
the latter had allied themselves with the Angara in their attack
on Lugh in January 1908, they soon afterwards fell out with the
Ethiopians and throughout the remainder of 1908 crossed into the
4
E.A.P. in large numbers.
Of course, it would be an oversimplification to imply that
the Marehan initiated all the raiding that occurred. In resisting
the Digodia and the Rer Afgab, they were doing no more than defend
1C. toG., 20 May 1907, PO. 37l/l92.
7T.S.Thomas (l917)» 92; Hope to Chief Sec., 12 June 1910,
PC/M’D/4/1/3.
3Z. to G., 10 Dec. 1906, CO.533/28.
^Salkeld to Sadler, 9 Jan. 1908, CO.533/41; H.A.Ward, to Hopwood,
13 Nov. 1908, CO.533/56.
454
their rights over a certain area. Their relationship with
their traditional neighbors, the Garre to the west and the
Aulihan to the south, was also far from being one-sided. "When
in 1909 the Marehan twice raided the latter, the first time
killing Hassan Warfa, an Aulihan chief, Hope and Salkeld were
of the opinion that this unrest was to be partly attributed to
the Aulihan themselves and, in particular, to Abdurahman Mursaal
who had been extremely keen to raid the Marehan. The latter knowing
this had struck before the Aulihan - who by themselves were weak -
had managed to form an alliance with the Rer Afgab. Thus towards
the end of 1908, Gwyan had failed to establish more than a temporary
2
cessation of raiding between the Rer Afgab, the Garre and the Marehan.
With the aid of Sheik Abdul Bari Sherif, Gwynn had managed to see all
the Marehan chiefs together at a baraza where he had told them
that the Government would sonn come and that in the mean-time they
should settle their disputes before Zaphiro. He had hoped that the
imminence of outside control would have acted as a stabiliser,
but it had not been long before raiding recommenced. Moreover,
when a station ms opened at Serenli in June 1910, the agreement
that was patched up between the Rer Hassan section of the Marehan
and the Aulihan to the south of the Juba proved to be equally transient.
Yet the factor that made it so necessary to control the
Marehan was not just that they were engaged in raiding, but that
many were armed with guns. What had made the Ethiopians hesitant
of attacking them, and what made them such formidable opponents,
was the relatively large number of rifles in their possession.
In this respect they differed from all the surrounding tribes.
At the end of 1908 the Marehan elders themselves admitted to possessing
500 to 600 guns. Just over a year later, it was being suggested
1G. to C., 7 June 19X0, CO.533/74.
2
idem, footnote 2.
3G. to C., 28 Deo. 1908, CO.533/54.
458
that at a low estimate the Marehan must have possessed at least
1,000 guns. Most of the later figures were merely guesses and
when in the middle of 1910 Hope suggested 800 guns, his low figure
reflected an optimism that was later proved to be false.'"
What had become obvious to Gwynn as early as 1908 was that
a greater danger lay in the increasing number of guns in the hands
of the Marehan than in the threat of Ethiopian border raids.^
Moreover, in the short run the Marehan were also a potential threat
to the post at Dolo. Gwynn had considered that the Boma grading
Company fort at Dolo was insecure but dared not recommend its
withdrawal because of the adverse psychological effect this would
have on the Somali,^
The Marehan obtained their guns from two sources. One was
by trade, the other from the migration southwards of fully armed
Marehan clans. Since the Marehan were rich in cattle, they were
certainly able to engage actively in the arms trade, and Zaphiro
had already concluded that there was a considerable traffic in
arms across the river Juba. Yet it may be doubted whether this
trade was itself a major factor before 1911 in the arming of the
Marehan, Most of the guns traded across the Juba came originally
from Jibuti via Ethiopia. They were French and their price
increased progressively the further west they were sold.
It would seem more
probable that before 1911 this trade was very limited. This can
be inferred from the very few guns in the hands of Somali clans
apart from the Marehan. Then, even amongst the Marehan, the Rer
Hassan did not possess large numbers of guns. In fact, it was
generally agreed by all observers that most of the guns were in the
hands of the galti Marehan who had brought these with them from
further north.
Another dimension to the problem was added by the fact that
almost all the galti Marehan had previously fought in Northern
Somaliland under Sheik Muhammad Abdille Hassan. Nor could it be
assumed that because they had left Sheik Muhammad, they were now
opposed to his aims.
https://books.google.com/books/about/Th ... P0GgAACAAJ
This book is quite long but worth the read, if you have access to an accredited institution's online database I'd recommend giving it a read. Check the appendix for the chapter relevant to your inquiry
