Moderators: Moderators, Junior Moderators
I did inadvertently expose Ina Mursaal as an informant? Lmao on lighter note. You're my awoowe bro. Just found out my paternal grandfather's mother was Reer Siyaad and he's Reer Garbaharey asal ahayn. Wallahi I didn't do that on purposeGuhad,
Ok bro, thank you for your enlightening contribution as always.
I just would be hesitant about bringing up Abdirahman Mursaal. He was paid British Colonial jaajuus/agent.
https://postimg.cc/0rLDZxcY
Ogaden are a enemy race to be ethnically cleansed. You burned your wadani card with Kismayo and Jubbaland. I'm happy Somalia/Somalis see the Khiyaano qaran you animals are. Your uncle Qalbidhagax should've been pissed on and killed. For siding with Kenya. This is your uncle Adan Barre Duale openly telling us he's a two card carrying traitor. Thank you Cagdheers. We will never help you again or save you like 77. We will piss on you:The problem is that the twisted history of these kids can't be debated because one of their admins deletes our messages.
This place is becoming a propaganda tool for the Ilka-yar Boons.
A laangaab Makahiil tryna debate with MX is ludicrous. If your were Maxamed Zubeer or Cawlyahan, we would've took you serious. You mfs are the rape babies and homesteaders of Jail Ogaden.
Then I shall call you Awoowe from now on. I'm not surprised aince reer Hassan are our immediate neighbors to the North and still live in Garbahaaray district with usI did inadvertently expose Ina Mursaal as an informant? Lmao on lighter note. You're my awoowe bro. Just found out my paternal grandfather's mother was Reer Siyaad and he's Reer Garbaharey asal ahayn. Wallahi I didn't do that on purposeGuhad,
Ok bro, thank you for your enlightening contribution as always.
I just would be hesitant about bringing up Abdirahman Mursaal. He was paid British Colonial jaajuus/agent.
https://postimg.cc/0rLDZxcY
The Sack of Serenli
On 2 February 1916, the disaster that British officials had feared would one day happen in the NFD occurred in neighboring Jubaland. There, a large party [End Page 11] of northern Aulihan led by Hajji 'Abdurrahman Mursaal surprised and killed the Serenli DC, Lieutenant Francis Elliot, and many of the British garrison. It is important to understand the motives that lay behind the sack of Serenli. The incident actually arose from a dispute between Aulihan and Marehan Somalis not long after the outbreak of the First World War and from which a series of raids and reprisals had followed. Following the deaths of nine Marehan at the hands of northern Aulihan and the looting of hundreds of camels, Lieutenant Elliot had publicly given 'Abdurrahman Mursaal an ultimatum to surrender the stolen animals to him within three days. Instead, the government-paid Reer Waffatu headman defiantly delivered a gift of black animals that, by Somali custom, constituted an open challenge to the Serenli DC. 22 The undaunted, but injudicious, Elliot apparently was contemptuous of the threat and failed to take precautions. Instead, he continued his incredible practice of locking the garrison's rifles in the guardroom each evening before sunset. 23 Moreover, he allowed a large contingent of Aulihan to camp just 100 yards from the boma.
At 7 p.m., while the askaris, or African soldiers, were settling down to evening meals, the Aulihan burst upon the British post. The Somalis set the surprised soldiers' huts on fire, and killed many of them as they fled the flames. By one account, 'Abdurrahman Mursaal himself is said to have shot Elliot beneath the ear with a revolver, and by another, to have donned Elliot's sun helmet after the raid. Dozens of Elliot's men were killed in the attack, while the survivors escaped across the Juba River to the nearby Italian post at Baardheere. The Somalis captured the company's maxim gun along with large quantities of arms and ammunition. 24 For the next 18 months, 'Abdurrahman Mursaal's northern Aulihan, strengthened by the acquisition of British weapons, held free reign over much of Jubaland and threatened British rule in the NFD as well. Indeed, a British officer with service in the region would later describe the Ogaden, of whom the Aulihan were a part, as "one of the most formidable fighting tribes in Africa" because of their mobility with their ponies, remarkable endurance, and the skill with which they wielded their spears. 25
The calamity that befell Elliot was undoubtedly partly his own doing. Nevertheless, the root of the problem stemmed from the unwillingness of higher authorities to bear the costs and accept the responsibilities of frontier [End Page 12] administration. As had been the case with other frontier representatives from the inception of British rule in northern Kenya, officials in Nairobi had placed Elliot in a position of weakness and forced him to improvise in a hostile milieu. Like those other British administrators and contrary to official policy, Elliot found himself thoroughly entangled in local politics. Reading the official records from the period, the historian is struck by the degree to which colonial officers became involved in petty disputes. At times, this involved an attempt to prevent Somali groups, including the Aulihan whom the officer-in-charge of the NFD blamed for "crowding in," from wresting the Wajir wells from the Boorana and their Ajuran allies. 26 In other cases, it entailed intrusion into feuds among the Somalis so that kaffirs, or infidels, became judges in conflicts that had heretofore been resolved by traditional means or with reference to shari'a, or Islamic law. Believing themselves impartial and just, British administrators presided over Somali shirs, mediated dia disputes, settled bride-wealth cases, and decided rights to watering sites. Such intervention could become dangerous for frontier representatives since they lacked legitimacy in Somali eyes and were without the means to enforce their decisions. That this was part of the reason for the Aulihan uprising is evidenced by the fact that, after the sack of Serenli, 'Abdurrahman Mursaal wrote a letter to King George V complaining of Lieutenant Elliot's partiality to the Marehan. 27 Meanwhile, although the taxation of Somalis had not yet been sanctioned, the authorities had long since pressured them to surrender camels for government transport. 28 Elliot, who took pride in his knowledge of the Somali language, did not fully appreciate the subtleties of Somali politics. 29 Moreover, he counted too much on his own abilities, and consequently paid the ultimate price for his folly.
Understanding something of the character of 'Abdurrahman Mursaal is also important, not only for appreciating the events which lay behind the Aulihan rebellion, but also for comprehending the critical fact of why other Somali groups failed to join his resistance to colonial rule. 'Abdurrahman Mursaal was the son of Mursaal bin Omar, an important Ogaden leader in Italian Somaliland. 30 The Aulihan chief and "holy man" came to the EAP after working for the Italian Benadir Company and running amiss of the Italian colonial administration. 31 'Abdurrahman Mursaal briefly served the Kismaayo [End Page 13] administration after 1896, when the British sent him and 18 constables to establish a customs post at Serenli. 32
He became a leader of an Ogaden rebellion in British territory in 1898, however, and was involved in the death of the Jubaland subcommissioner, A. C. W. Jenner in late 1900. 33 Nevertheless, the Reer Waffatu chief was soon working with the British again. So slight was the influence of the colonial authorities over the Somalis that they took help where they could get it. Some were not so ready to secure his services. John Hope, one of the first British officials to serve in the NFD, condemned 'Abdurrahman Mursaal's proclivities for independent action, and C. S. Reddie, a Jubaland Provincial Commissioner (PC), accused the Aulihan leader of gun-running. 34 Nevertheless, Captain R. E. Salkeld, a British officer in Jubaland who subsequently became the PC, was willing to rely on 'Abdurrahman Mursaal. 35 In fact, the Aulihan leader had the opportunity to meet with the EAP governor in 1915, and used his interview to promote his personal authority when he returned to Serenli. 36 Obviously, the Aulihan leader was a man who took his own counsel, and one who could not be pushed too far. Elliot's inability to grasp this led to tragic consequences for him and his men as well as the Aulihan chief's followers when colonial troops finally suppressed their rebellion.
"'Abdurrahman Mursaal's northern Aulihan, strengthened by the acquisition of British weapons, held free reign over much of Jubaland and threatened British rule in the NFD as well. Indeed, a British officer with service in the region would later describe the Ogaden, of whom the Aulihan were a part, as "one of the most formidable fighting tribes in Africa" because of their mobility with their ponies, remarkable endurance, and the skill with which they wielded their spears."
By Allah, I will not be a slave to the Government.
--'Abdurrahman Mursaal, February 1917
Whereas the Marehan were prepared to observe the
truce negotiated by the local administrator, Captain Elliot. Abdirahman mursal, the chief of the auliyahan ogaden rejected the truce.
Abdirahman requested to be given a day to consult with his elders concerning the
ultimatum. Instead of coming to the negotiating haraza, however, Abdirahman and his people
sacked Fort Serenli on the evening of 10 March 1916. The unsuspecting British forces at th
fort were mercilessly routed and the District Commissioner, Captain Elliot, was murdered
by Abdirahman Mursal 'with his own hand' . 46 The Auliyahan then began systematic
looting of government stores and even the local business community was not spared. The
government was forced to evacuate Fort Serenli to Kismayu in the south and Moyale to the
north west. For two years Abdirahman Mursal was the authority in northern Jubaland and
the British could do nothing
The sacking of Serenli was unique, in Jubaland' s history because' of the vast damage that had
befallen the British in the Jubaland,47 and it was only comparable to the lawlessness and
destruction of both property and looting that was taking place in British Somali land in the
north in the same period. The casualties were disheartening for 'over 35 IK.A.R] soldiers
were killed and about 50 civilians lost their lives,48 during- the sacking of Serenli. The
Auliyahan looted the town for two days
"Number 2 column proceeded down the Juba River as far as Malkaadi, halting on the 22nd to
await the arrival of the inland party. Later news reached the camp that No 1 column had
captured a large quantity of enemy camels, but was being attacked by Auhilan in force. The
Marehan Levies had bolted, but the KAR troops were holding firm. Immediately, Captain
Martin despatched 30 Somali Riflemen under Colour Sergeant Mohamed Amiashi and a
further 150 Marehan Levies to Hafalani, six hours march away. The inland column (Colour
Sergeant Fareh Rageh) having driven off the tribesmen succeeded in reaching Hafalani the
following morning. Shortly afterwards some 2000 camels were captured as they came to
water. Colour Sergeant Farah Rageh decided to drive them on to Serenli, but was waylaid by
a strong force (estimated at several hundred) of Aulihan. A running fight lasting several hours
ensued. Once again the Marehan Levies proved to be absolutely useless and bolted. Heavily
outnumbered (Colour Sergeant Mohamed Ainashi’s force had not yet caught up), the small
KAR force adopted the tactic of laying prone on the sand & volley firing as the tribesmen
approached. Over fifty of the Aulihan were killed and many wounded. Again the levies did
not perform at all well, and almost without exception ran away. They lost 17 killed and many
wounded. In many cases they had been stabbed in the back as they fled. It was of course
quite impossible to keep hold of 2000 camels in those circumstances and only 160 actually
reached Serenli. No 1 column after handing over the camels re-joined No2 column at
Malkaadi."
"Corporal Jama Mohamed of G Company had a narrow escape, severely wounded he was
stabbed by an Aulihan with his own bayonet. A Government scout Samanter Aden bravely
rushed forward and wounded the tribesman before he could kill the corporal."
"The final statistics for the campaign were: Auhilan dead counted on the field 92 (although the
tribe estimated a figure of well over 300); largebore rifles taken 402; Government rifles
recaptured (from Lieutenant Elliott’s disaster) 32; ammunition taken 16, 000 rounds; Maxim
gun recaptured in good condition (Lieut. Elliott’s). In addition, over 5000 camels were taken
to Sereneli (this is excluding those claimed by the Government fine). Captain Martin had
achieved this result with only five British Officers and 96 Somali troops (G and the MI
Company) supported by just over 100 Swahali troops and the rather useless Marehan Levies.
The latter had continuously proven their unreliablability under fire.
Indeed, when the punitive expedition actually got underway, many of the
British askaris were Isaak Somalis from British Somaliland, and a number of
local Marehan joined the colonial troops in suppressing the Aulihan.
Such internecine fighting among the Somalis gave the colonial authorities
the breathing space they so desperately needed. Early in the crisis, Colonel
George Thesiger, the KAR Inspector General, had expressed the crux of British
policy succinctly. He wrote that playing the Marehan and Muhammad Zubeir
off against the Aulihan was “the essential need of our frontier policy for the
duration of the war.
according to Sa’id Ahmed bin Sheikh, a British intelligence
agent at Baardheere, organized a force of 700 men to oppose Aulihan
egress through their domains into Italian Somaliland.95 Paradoxically, when the
Marehan asked for British assistance, the Jubaland PC voiced the opinion that
the Somalis were simply “agitating in order to obtain arms and ammunition
from the Government.”96 Imperial authorities now were taking allies on their
own terms, and remained wary of armed Marehan.
Barrett still
thought the Marehan unreliable allies, and proposed that the British go it alone
against the rebels.
Only a small number of these
were taken to Serenli, however, as the Marehan levies with whom they were
entrusted bolted with the confiscated animals
Meanwhile, Marehan levies conscripted to help the British with the seized
Aulihan stock had scrambled off with many captured animals to the embarrassment
of colonial officials.
Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 6 guests
