Why There Can Be No Peace with Meles Zenawi
BY Muktar M. Omer
March 06, 2012
Vulgar Wisdom
I have no intention of discussing Elisabeth Pisani’s unsettling stories from the red-light frontlines of Jakarta in the “Wisdom of Whores”. I mention it here to drive home the point that wisdom is to be found in the unlikeliest of places for those who are in thoughtful quest. It does not always gush out from professorial eloquence or excerpts from hard-cover autobiographies of prominent personalities.
For example, there is a vulgar wisdom to be learnt from a seasoned adulterer. The day you walk into the connubial bed of a married women, you do not sleep naked or with only slender vest on, and all eyes slammed shut. Rather, you keep your shoes fastened on your suffocated feet, shirtfront open but shirt on, and with one unblinking eye resolutely fixed on the exit door. You enjoy the stolen fruits with the alertness of a sprinter waiting for the sound of the bell to start flying. The slightest stupor in mind or body earns you a broken skull and fractured bones; or if unlucky, a fatal shot at the abdomen. And the bad thing is the police will not take bloody chin and split bones as vivid exhibitions of abuse suffered; they are not a cause or explanation of violence. Blood and gaping wounds, however gruesome, will not grant you automatic innocence. You will have to answer tough questions about how you got the bruises and burns, even if that has to be from a hospital bed.
But this is commonsense; an adulterer does not have to be a veteran to know this. Where the smartness of a serial bed-hopper kicks in, is with the prudential selection he makes about where to feast and where not to. This involves a rapid assessment of who the owner of the carnally charitable women is. The wily adulterer asks for information from those who would know about the fate of other womanizers who dared to sneak into this house of sin. If a pioneer before him lost limbs or teeth for stepping into the target women’s house, he decides that this particular house is a no-go area, with the calculation that the danger outweighs the sensual pleasure to be had.
This thought ecology was necessary to introduce the theme I intend to discuss in this installment; which is about why those who wish to make peace with Meles Zenawi must first conduct a methodical review of Meles’s record in making peace with erstwhile adversaries and honoring such agreements. The moral import of the foregoing metaphor is that an analysis of the present Meles cannot be comprehensive, if delinked from a look-back at past practices of this deadly political serpent.
Invincibility Hangover
Meles Zenawi joined the Tigray People’s Liberation Front at a very young age. Unlike the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) who faced a long-drawn-out war with Ethiopia, the Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) faced trying times only in the first ten years. By 1985, the tide started to decisively turn against Mengistu Hailemariam’s Derg regime. The last seven years of the 17 years the TPLF fought were not easy for them by any imagination, but politically, victory was always in sight as the hated Military junta started to quickly unravel and die. What led to the demise of Mengistu’s regime is beyond the scope of this discussion. The relevance of this historical review is to underscore the relative brevity of difficult days in Meles’s political life and how this shaped his political attitude.
The fervor of youth and the hypnotizing idealism of Marxism-Leninism insulated Meles from despair in the early days of the struggle when things were tough. Soon, the TPLF struggle started blooming and from there on, it was a joyride for Meles, who worked in the propaganda department, and did not have to contend with lethal encounters with the Derg military. Meles and the TPLF met few setbacks along the way, and no real defeats from 1985 onwards. This instilled a feeling of invincibility in him and an inherent belief that the TPLF can win all wars – present or future. He therefore sees little value in making compromises. He (as part of the group led by Abbay Tsehaye) overcome the second internal dissent (Hinfishfish) within TPLF in 1978 by killing dissenters; He defeated the Derg; he outfoxed the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF); he won the war against Eritrea; he survived an attempted purge by his former TPLF comrades; he incapacitated an Amhara resurgence in 2005 elections; he crushed the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia
These reassuring chains of victories intoxicated his political mind, and he simply cannot contemplate the possibility of defeat. It follows that if defeat is out of the game, there surely is little reason for him to seek compromises that would limit his political reach and dent his personal ego. The attendant invincibility hangover therefore underwrites and explains Meles’s political chauvinism. Meles partially attributes this ‘invincibility’ to his ancestry. That impassioned speech at Mekelle in mid-1990s was massively illustrative of intrinsic Tigrayan chauvinism. “I am happy to be born from the Tigray people, who when tested with fire, proved to be gold,” He ranted. At the time, fuming Amharas opined, “So, are we the ones who are made of cloth and (who) will go up in flames when tested with fire?” Meles also credits his political shrewdness and suave diplomacy for his political exploits. In truth, global events since September 11, 2001, did more to prolong Meles’s reign than his ancestry or individual cleverness. To give the midget devil his due, he played his cards well though.
The conclusion of this review is that Meles Zenawi neither comprehends the compulsion of compromises nor respects pacts he makes with rivals. OLF, ONLF, Eritrea, Ethiopian leftist organizations such as EPRP in the early days, and Kinijit are all victims of TPLF’s political deception. Anyone who today entertains the idea of making a genuine peace deal with Meles must be politically adolescent. Zenawi does not understand the language of peace and compromise. He understands the language of war and complete annihilation of enemies. To agree with him is to fully submit to his dictates and whims. Or to be granted amnesty like the United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF) did a year ago. The philosophy of give-and-take is not one Meles is used to or can entertain. Compromise is a heresy in his kingdom.
Perennial Peace Defaulters
Recently, news of an impending peace talks between Ethiopia and the ONLF abounded. Many wonder where that process stands today. I will share what I know. Siraj Fergissa, Ethiopia’s Minister of Defense and a certain Colonel Gebre met the Kenyan-Somali officials who were facilitating the preparatory works for the talks. For Colonel Gabre, to be a Somali is to be Salad Ali Jeele, Yusuf Dabageed, and Mohamed Dheere. For Meles, to be a Somali is to beg the Tigrayan rulers in Addis Ababa for political support for own clan. Or at best to personify a black Ramzan Kadyrov and implement Meles’s anti-insurgency model from Chechnya in Somali Region of Ethiopia. A Somali can be nothing more. A talk between a TPLF official and a Somali delegate is always a heart-rending display of asymmetrical power relations.
Reliving this history, Colonel Gabre contemptuously told the Kenyan Somali officials that, because they hail from the “ONLF” clan, they should represent the ONLF and start talking on its behalf. This is called “contempt as a negotiation tactic”. The Kenyan-Somali officials were not used to this sort of arrogance and would have none of it. They reportedly rebuffed the petulant instruction. We are there now. Even before ONLF could talk to TPLF, the Kenyan-Somali officials are finding TPLF behavior extremely weird. The problem for the TPLF was that the Kenyan-Somali officials were a different set of Somalis to the parvenus and warlords the Ethiopians have been dealing with for many years. These ones do not need Meles’s blessing for their political survival, nor are they ignorant fortune-seekers.
The military in Ethiopia reportedly opposes this peace deal. The regional government is doing everything to block it. This is not because the military and the puppet regional administration honestly believe the war with the ONLF is over, but because the war is beneficial to their existence. The war economy in Somali region is making many Generals and security personnel rich. The puppet regional administrators benefit from the continued insecurity.
Whether Meles, who is said to believe that there will be some political and economic capital to be earned from a shoddy peace deal with ONLF, would overrule the military is yet to be seen. But that may not be even relevant. Neither Meles’s past nor his present political philosophy indicates that he takes peace deals seriously. The last one he signed with Eritrea, in the presence of international bodies, has not led to peace because he still refuses to implement his side of the bargain. He continues to use flimsy excuses to default. The question therefore is why any rational political organization would waste time thinking about peace with Meles, when indications are that they will not get any meaningful concessions; and that even if they were to get some concessions, there is no guarantee that the TPLF would not go back on its word.
The myth of ‘Bad Amhara, Good Tigre’
A boring theme of discussion which generates valueless dilemmas and controversies is the myth that the Tigres are less of an enemy to the Somalis than the Amharas. This myth violates a foundational political precept. In politics, enemies and friends are not determined by biological dispositions, but by the convergence or divergence of interests. The Ethiopia that was and continues to be instrumental in messing up Somalia in the last two decades is the Ethiopia of TPLF. No Ethiopian ruler has inflicted more pain on Somalis than Meles Zenawi. No Ethiopian ruler had killed more Somalis in the Somali Region of Ethiopia than Zenawi. No Ethiopian rulers in history have impaired the psyche and political soul of Somalis more than the TPLF. Where is then the talk of a benevolent Tigre and a monstrous Amhara coming from? Is it because the TPLF instituted phony federalism, out of pragmatic necessity, which gave few nominal political and economic entitlements to Somalis in Ethiopia? How do such meager entitlements weigh against the massive abuses against the people in the region? How does an asphalt road between Jigjiga and Qabridahare balance with the blood of thousands of Somali civilians (mainly from the Ogaden clan) in Somali region butchered by TPLF and its rowdy militias? How does hosting few thousands of Somali refugees in Addis Ababa measure against the thousands of civilians Ethiopian soldiers killed in Mogadishu? What about the sustained sabotage against the reconstruction of the Somalia State?
A subsidiary myth to the ‘benevolent Tigres’ myth is that the Amharas would kill all Somalis and would try to annex the port of Mogadishu if they ever come to power. Where is the evidence or the precedence? Where does this story come from? Is it not the TPLF that disseminates this pernicious propaganda against the Amhara with the aim of turning other Ethiopian nationalities against this rival ethnic group, which it fears most? Why does goodwill and social temperament even matter in a political tussle? It is inconsequential who ‘loves’ or who ‘hates’ us. We get what we work for. And by the way, why does trust factor in as a core matter in political alliance-building? Why not budget for political gamesmanship from our allies and put in place diligent safeguards and contingencies that would ensure we are not caught off-guard? Are we naturally predisposed to be outwitted forever?
All said, in the current circumstance, would it not be better to deal with the Amharas and Oromos who are victims of Meles than to talk to proven defaulters like Meles? Is it not finding common ground with these opposition groups that determine whether we would be enemies or allies? Why not explore this political horizon than waste time on recasting the ugly movie we co-starred with the TPLF in early 1990s? At the worst, a coalescing of a viable Ethiopian opposition to Meles would coerce him to offer real concessions to those who cannot single-handedly threaten his throne, like us. In addition to the ongoing armed struggle, the most effective strategy to depose Meles would be to create an all-inclusive political formation, which will market itself as an alternative to EPRDF. Achieving that would not be a simple mission, but endorsing the concept as the correct approach is the starting point.
Taking the cue from the farsighted adulterer
When faced with Meles’s peace gimmicks, it is useful to take the cue from the vulgar farsightedness of the adulterer in the introductory lines of this article. The house of Meles is where a prudent adulterer would not want to venture into. To do that would be a fatal dalliance with severe consequences. Most of those who tried to sleep in Meles’s furtive political bed did not survive to tell their ordeal. The few who survived carry multiple visible scars from that misstep. The breakdown of the so-called talks between ONLF and Ethiopia is not only inevitable, it is actually imminent. Harvest thick hair from my tender palm and shave my stubble with broken bottles if my prophecy does not turn right! I am not a soothsayer, but understanding the future starts with exploring the past. Meles’s past is about using talks as tactical ploys to wrong-foot enemies, not as a strategy to solve political problems. For Meles, politics is a zero-sum game; it has no win-win outcomes.
Mukhtar M. Omer
WardheerNews Contributor
E-Mail:muktaromer@ymail.com
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