Postby Knight of Wisdom » Thu Aug 25, 2011 3:06 pm
SSC Regional Administration of Somalia
Somalia
PRESS RELEASE
August 24, 2011
Addressed to:
The Chairman of the Security Council Committee
UN Political Office for Somalia
The International Community
Dear Sir/ Madam,
The following is a response to Mr. Matt Braydon’s 2011 Report (Letter dated 20 June 2011) on
Somalia (supposedly the head of the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia). This response is restricted
to the parts of the report that concern the issues of the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn Regional
Administration of Somalia (SSC Regional Administration of Somalia). All other parts in the report
that address Somalia are left for the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) to deal with
them.
1. But, first, we would like to highlight the lack of impartiality on the part of Mr. Matt
Braydon who is a known supporter for the one clan secessionist group in Somalia’s north
a.k.a. Somaliland. It is widely circulated among Somalis that Mr. Matt Braydon is
hired/recruited by the secessionists in Hargeisa to promote their secession. Other reports
confirm the existence of matrimonial bond between Mr. Matt Braydon and the Somali
secessionists. Therefore, the readers of Mr. Matt Braydon’s report are cautioned not to
miss to see the conflict of interest and the reduced ability of Matt Braydon to carry any
meaningful impartial research, analysis, and reporting from that part of the world. Any
report to be credible, specially one addressed to the UN Security Council, would require
to be balanced, impartial, fact, and prepared by a party of arms length. However, this is
not the case, in Mr. Matt Braydon’s 2011 UN Monitoring group for Somalia Report,
when it comes to how the report handles its reporting of the conflict between the SSC
regional Administration of Somalia and the one clan secessionist group in Hargeisa
calling itself ‘Somaliland’. In that regard, the report is extremely biased and intentionally
supportive to the secessionist group for the reasons mentioned above.
Here are more details to clarify specific issues in Matt Braydon’s prejudiced Report and
other informative historical facts since the collapse of the Somali Central Government in
1991:
2. Unfortunately, in his report, Mr. Matt Brayden lists the SSC Regional Administration
under the section of ‘acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia’ (III.
Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia page 17 of the report). This
misleading characterization is completely contrary to the truth, realities, and facts on the
ground. Somalia has not had any effective central government since 1991, except for the
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fledgling Transitional Federal Government that has been taking shape for the last few
years. As a result, while there are efforts to change the status quo, initially Somalia has
disintegrated into tribal territories and currently continue to be so, and the Dhulbahante
tribes in the SSC regions (among the major tribes in Somalia) were the first, among
Somalis, to mobilize and organize to restore peace and order and establish a semblance of
administrative institutions in their territories (see the Boocame Conferences 1 & 2 in the
early 1990s). The Dhulbahante and their SSC administration never attacked other tribal
jurisdictions, but instead were deeply involved in the efforts of Somalia reconciliation
and restoration of democratic governance. Also, since 1991 the Dhulbahante were in full
control of their territories (either by their own or being part of Puntland) until the
secessionist Isaaq clan a.k.a Somaliland started trespassing the territorial integrity of the
Dhulbahante in late 2004. In October 2004 the Isaaq militia began skirmishes, attacks on
the Dhulbahante civilians and villages on the tribal borders and established few illegal
militia stations in the SSC territories. Thus, Mr. Matt Braydon is corrected here, because
the Isaaq clan and their secessionist administration in Hargeisa are the party that threatens
peace, security, and stability of Somalia.
3. The Boocame Conferences were held at the backdrop of ongoing consultations among the
Dhulbahante traditional leaders, intellectuals, and social groups in preparation to the
possible consequences of an imminent collapse of Somalia government on the face of an
armed rebellion and social unrest. Deliberations on the resolutions that later passed in
Boocame 1 and 2 were largely took place even before the collapse of the Somalia’s
central Government
4. In the Boocame 1 & 2 Conferences in the early 1990s, the SSC had established their
autonomous regional administration and formed a parliament. The mandate given to the
newly formed administration was to administer the SSC regions until a central Somali
government is restored. The leaders were also mandated to closely work with other
Somalis in other regions of the country and the international community to facilitate
reconciliation and the restoration of the Somali Central Government
5. The SSC leaders, pursuant to the mandates and resolutions of the Boocame 1 & 2
Conferences, had participated in many reconciliation efforts, talks, negotiations that took
place in many parts of Somalia and abroad. For example, in Burao, Borama, Mogadishu,
Galkaio, garowe, Bosaso, Kenya, Ethiopia, Cairo, Djibouti and elsewhere
6. The secessionist Isaaq clan a.k.a Somaliland thoughtlessly keep trying to portray some
Dhulbahante leaders’ participation in Burao and Borama peace talks as an agreement for
secession. Nonetheless, the participation of some SSC leaders in Burao and Borama were
in line with SSC mandate to talk, reconcile, solidify peace and security, and help
facilitate the restoration of a shared democratic, just, and prosperous Somali government
7. In 1998 the SSC, Makhir, Nugal, Bari, and parts of Mudug have come together and
formed an Autonomous Regional State called Puntland. In other words, the Harti Somali
clans in the north of Somalia had established Puntland State. This is a further evidence of
the tribal disintegration of Somalia. Further, the formation of Puntland was in line of the
vision and mandate of Boocame 1 & 2 to support and facilitate a peaceful Somalia and
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the restoration of a Central Somali Government. And, this were precisely the objectives
of the establishment of the Puntland State
8. There were and still remain few individuals who hail from the SSC (names can change
from time to time) and who for their own self interest seek jobs and other business
interests from the secessionists. These opportunistic individuals are not necessarily
representative of the SSC
9. As mentioned above, the secessionist Isaaq clan began their attacks on the SSC territories
in late 2004. However, the Isaaq secessionists a.k.a. Somaliland had launched their
heaviest aggression in October 2007, where they succeeded in capturing the regional
capital city of Lasanod and its environs. As a result, the Puntland State had retreated
completely from the SSC regions betraying its mandate for safeguarding both the tribal
territories and Somali unity
10. Equally important, after the fall of Lasanod in the hands of the Isaaq secessionists and the
evacuation of Puntland entirely from the SSC, the Dhulbahante tribes had held their
Boocame 3 conference to discuss the way forward under the duress. The resolutions of
this conference were two fold: They called upon the Isaaq secessionist aggressors to end
their violations against mutual peace, security, and stability of the northern part of
Somalia and Somalia in general and peacefully evacuate the SSC territories occupied by
their militia. On the other hand, it called upon Puntland State to exercise its mandate and
ensure the secessionist Isaaq militia retreat to their respective tribal territories.
Regrettably, for two years, the Puntland state nor the Isaaq secessionists had responded
positively and did what they were supposed to do
11. The SSC people, finding themselves in these difficult circumstances of a naked Isaaq
aggression and classic Puntland betrayal, had sought the remedy in re-launching their
Autonomous Regional Administration – SSC Regional Administration of Somalia in a
conference held in Nairobi Kenya in 2009. This is not a newly formed regional state;
rather it is a withdrawal from the Puntland partnership and resorting back to the stand
alone of Boocame 1 &2.
12. The resolutions of the Nairobi Conference in 2009 were ratified in a conference held in
2010 inside the SSC territories –Somalia, in Holhol and Buura-wadal. The conference
was attended by all the traditional leaders of the SSC, all SSC leaders, representatives of
all SSC social groups, and SSC people of all walks of life
13. Even with the re-launch of the SSC Regional Administration of Somalia, a window of
opportunity was left open for Puntland to rectify its mistakes and cooperate with the SSC
administration to liberate the occupied territories from the trespassing secessionists. The
SSC resolution in Nairobi Kenya was explicit in informing the Puntland leaders that the
way they conduct themselves in dealing with the SSC efforts to liberate the occupied
parts of SSC would ultimately determine the future relationship of Puntland and the SSC.
Unfortunately, Puntland State chose not to cooperate but continued to conspire against
the SSC.
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14. Clearly, the claim of the Isaaq secessionists that the SSC are part and parcel of their
secession remained bogus. The fact the Isaaq secessionists can’t utter in front of any
Somali person that SSC is part of their Isaaqland a.k.a Somaliland (propaganda for
foreign consumption) tells volumes as they are regarded within Somalia the laughing
stock chasing a mirage. Also telling volumes, the fact the Isaaq clan got the cautious
courage to trespass the Dhulbahante land is just as recent as 2004 and 2007 while they
declared their secession as early as 1991. The Isaaq’s cautious courage to attack the
Dhulbahante was a result of a clandestine conspiracy with the Majeerteen of Puntland.
Fortunately, the conspiracy had failed miserably and backfired, because the Dhulbahante
are aware and stand guard of their land, administration, interests, and dignity.
15. The secessionist Isaaq militia is only occupying very small areas of the SSC, mainly the
Capital city of Lasanod and its vicinity. The SSC regional administration and its people
are still calling upon the secessionist Isaaq clan to peacefully withdraw from the small
parts they occupy of the SSC regions. The international community is also asked to assist
in getting the Isaaq disoriented clan back to its tribal territories. Any other alternative
would be destructive, rout, and characterized with unnecessary bloodshed. The
secessionist Isaaqs had already caused destruction, bloodshed, displacement and
kidnapping of innocent SSC civilians back to the Isaaq territories
16. And, for the record, the Puntland is reduced to be a project of the majeerteen tribe, the
same way as Somaliland is an Isaaq project. Thus, the SSC is a Dhulbahante Project and
Galmudug is a Habar-Gidir Project. The same applies in other tribal fiefdoms in Somalia.
However, the worst tribal project is the Isaaq clan Project – a.k.a. Somaliland. The Isaaq
clan is adamant with the project of secession and is uncompromising with other Somalis.
Worst of all, the Isaaq are attempting to secede with the foolish mind set to grab other
tribes’ territories and forcefully expel populations of other tribes from their rightful tribal
territories, for instance the SSC and others – indeed a thoughtless bizarre scheme that will
never see the light of day.
SSC Regional Administration of Somalia is deeply disappointed that Mr. Matt Braydon
for obvious reasons had overlooked such a tribally disintegrated Somali society and his
attempts to make the UN believe that one Somali clan (Isaaq) have the ability to secede
from the rest of Somalia and rule over other Somali clans (such as the Major Somali
Tribes of Dhulbahante).
17. Mr. Matt Braydon writes in his report, “ 81. Another threat to peace and stability,
unrelated to Al-Shabaab, is the Sool Sanaag Cayn Army (SSCA), a clan-based militia
active in parts of Sool region. Conceived, funded and led by members of the Dhulbahante
clan diaspora, SSCA can be characterized as an opportunistic and arguably mercenary
militia force that has successfully appropriated legitimate local grievances and exploited
radical diaspora sentiment for its own political and financial gain”!
Is SSCA Clan based militia? So is the attacking Isaaq militia.
Is SSC Conceived, funded and led by members of the Dhulbahante clan diaspora?
Wrong, the SSC Regional Administration of Somalia was not conceived by the
Dhulbahante clan Diaspora, because it was locally established in Boocame 1 &2 in 1991
and 1993 as a result of the collapse of the Somali government in 1991. Instead, the Isaaq
clan based Diaspora has conceived, funded, and led the terrorist SNM rebel group which
later gave birth to the one clan based Isaaq secession. Ever since its inception the Isaaq
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secession project is also led and funded by the Isaaq Disapora. Mr. Matt Braydon needs
to explain who are the current leadership of the Isaaq secession a.k.a Somaliland? Ahmed
Mohamed Silanyo, the Isaaq president (Isaaq London Diaspora), Abdurahman Cirro, the
Isaaq parliament speaker (Isaaq Finland Diaspora), Mohamed Abdullahi Omer the Isaaq
foreign minister (Isaaq London Diaspora), Faisal Ali Warabe, the leader of the tribal
Garxajis party – UCID (Isaaq Finland Diaspora), almost their Isaaq cabinet members,
almost their Isaaq parliament members, just almost everyone in the leadership of the
secession. Similarly, the Isaaq Diaspora Somaliland Forum who have offices and
representation in everywhere, Europe, North America, and Arabia for the sole purpose of
lobbying the secession and mobilizing the Isaaq Diaspora in favor of secession.
Likewise, who is Abdurahman Faroole, the Majeerteen current president of Puntland?
He is from the Majeerteen Diaspora in Australia. Adde Mussa, the previous Majeerteen
president was from the Majeerteen Diaspora in Canada, just to name a few. The same is
correct with the Galmudug State, Xeeb and Ximan, and even the Transitional Federal
Government.
Can the SSCA be characterized as an opportunistic and arguably mercenary militia force?
With all due respect, Mr. Matt Braydon needs to look up the dictionary for the meaning
of the word ‘mercenary’! The SSCA are in their (own) tribal territories and acting only in
self defense. Mr. Matt Braydon also needs to look up the dictionary for words to
characterize the aggression of the Isaaq militia who came out from their tribal land and
attacking the peace loving Sool, Sanaag and Cayn people and territories
Can the SSCA be characterized as an opportunistic and arguably mercenary militia force
that has successfully appropriated legitimate local grievances and exploited radical
Diaspora sentiment for its own political and financial gain?
To set the record straight, the Dhulbahante has no grievances against the Isaaq and their
tribal administration in Hargeisa, nor they regard the secessionist Isaaq as a legitimate
authority beyond what it is – a tribal arrangement not different than the other tribal
arrangements that exist in the country – Somalia. The SSC Regional Administration of
Somalia is deeper and more complex than what the Isaaq secessionists and Mr. Matt
Braydon wish for; it’s larger than anyone individual and group within the SSC. The SSC
Regional Administration is collective Dhulbahante/Somalia ownership and no one is
allowed or able to use it for a political and/or personal gain. Sorry!
The role of the Dhulbahante Diaspora is to assist the SSC Regional Administration of
Somalia moving towards democracy, peace, and progress and within united Somalia.
The Dhulbahante Diaspora also serves to stop the Predatory Isaaq Diaspora and blind
secession to inflict additional damage, destruction, and bloodshed in the SSC territories.
18. The characterization of who successfully appropriated local grievances and exploited
radical Diaspora (and local) sentiment for its own political and financial gain is more so
with the SNM (Somali National Movement) and the current Isaaq Secession
promoters/drivers. They are the ones who had /have grievances against a legitimate
previous Somali government and the current legitimate Somali Transitional Federal
Government. The secessionists with their grievances legitimate or not had chosen to
chase wrong alternatives and secession rather than coming to the negotiation table to
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sorting out the conflict through the Somali reconciliation process. The weirdest claim the
secessionist wish to falsely brag about is their attempt to make the international
community believe them when they say ‘we did our reconciliation alone, yes under a
tree! The south of Somalia and Africa should learn from us!!! What reconciliation did
they do? They did not reconcile with one single tribe in Somalia. No single Somali tribe
wants secession from Somalia except some disoriented Isaaqs. It is only the Isaaq clan in
one small box isolated in a corner. The Isaaq clan is in conflict with each and every
Somali tribe
19. All other Somali tribes, except the aggressive secessionist Isaaq clan, are prepared to talk
and reconcile, because they know the conflict in Somalia is purely bad politics which
could be rectified in one way or other
20. Mr. Matt Braydon states, “82. Contested between Somaliland and Puntland, Sool region
has long been an area of tension and sporadic violence. Dhulbahante clan elites have been
divided between those who support the administration in Hargeysa and since its
establishment in 1998, the administration in Garoowe. In recent years, however,
Dhulbahante disaffection with both Somaliland and Puntland has given rise to a growing
constituency within the clan that supports neither administration and seeks autonomy
within a unitary Somali State. As elsewhere in Somalia, such choices often reflect local
competition for power and resources between sub-clan elites”
This statement is largely wrong information. The SSC regions have long been the most
peaceful and stable territories in Somalia, at the time before the collapse of the Somali
government and after its collapse. SSC regions were the only territories were no
fighting/wars, destruction, and displacements have taken place during the Somali civil
wars. The violence has started only after the attacks of the Isaaq secessionist militias
(under the authority of Isaaq secessionists in Hargeisa) on the SSC in late 2004. And, the
violation remains since 2004 with the presence of the aggressive secessionist militias in
the SSC territories.
As to the few SSC individuals who still work with either the secessionist Isaaq clan or the
Puntland, they are irrelevant. As mentioned above, the SSC Regional administration is
much larger than anyone individual or group. Mr. Ahmed Abdi Habsade and Abdisamad
Ali Shire are not different than Mr. Matt Braydon. Each of those individuals is in a short
term piece work contract.
Interestingly, Mr. Matt Braydon accuses the SSC people, “As elsewhere in Somalia, such
choices often reflect local competition for power and resources between sub-clan elites”.
The fact of the matter, however, the vast majority of the SSC people do not compete for
power and resources within their territories and elsewhere with other regions of Somalia.
The SSC people have resolved to have their autonomous regional administration, build
their territories and lives, and live in peace with themselves and others. The SSC people
are not engaged in offensive activities to forcefully rule Hargeisa, Garowe, Mogadishu
and/or grab territories/resources – oil, minerals or fertile land of other Somali tribes. The
Riix Kana Daawo Wararka WidhWidh Online
SSC people are determined though to administer their territories and be safe and sound
within their space. Also, the SSC people and their SSC regional administration of
Somalia wish the same for every Somali community. The other alternative that SSC
people accept is that Somalis come together put the conflict behind and have a fresh and
promising future.
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21. Mr. Matt Braydon claims that the SSC is the creation of the NSUM, and writes, “83. The
Sool Sanaag Cayn Army was formed in late 2007, following the capture of Laascaanood,
the capital of Sool region by pro-Somaliland forces, as the military wing of the Northern
Somali Unionist Movement (NSUM). NSUM is a diaspora network dominated by
members of the Dhulbahante clan, which professes to be “a grass-roots Somali
organization” opposed to “the one-clan-driven secession calling themselves
‘Somaliland’”, and which “stands for the promotion of peace and unity among the long-
suffering people of Somalia”.
This statement is largely true except that the NSUM had created the SSCA as its military
wing in 2007. As we explained earlier, the establishment of the SSC Administration goes
back to 1991 and 1993. Mr. Matt Braydon has confusion here, what had been formed in
2007 after the fall of Lasanod in the hands of the secessionist Isaaqs is the NSUM itself.
This movement was created to counter balance the other Isaaq Diaspora movement of
‘Somaliland Forum”. The NSUM is commended for the valuable work they did since in
the foreign diplomatic lobbying, raising the international community awareness to the
realities on the ground in the SSC territories, and disclosing the bogus claims surrounding
the Isaaq secession
22. However, in a meeting of the SSC held in London UK in April 2011, all parties of the
SSC including the NSUM had agreed to operate under the banner of the Sool, Sanaag,
and Cayn Regional Administration of Somalia
23. In the same SSC meeting in London in April 2011, it was also agreed that a grand
Dhulbahante consultative conference be held in the SSC territories in the near future -
Already, preparation work in progress in the highest levels in the SSC territories. The
objectives of the meeting include moving forward the work, agenda, and mandate of the
SSC Regional Administration of Somalia. The participants will also discuss the best way
forward for the wider Somalia reconciliation
24. Mr. Braydon writes, “2. The Kaalshaale clashes and the emergence of the SSCA are
illustrative of a relatively new and disturbing trend: the
‘diasporization’ of the Somali conflict”(Annex 1.3)
Please see #16 above to understand how biased this statement is. The Diasporization of
the Somali conflict is not a new trend; it’s what started the Somali conflict in the first
place with the emergence of the armed SNM (Isaaq Secessionists), SSDF (Majeerteen of
Puntland) and others that followed. The SSC is by far the only one administration that
was peacefully and locally established through consultative process in Boocame 1 & 2 in
1991 and 1993
25. Matt Braydon tells us the following, “… in other cases, such as the SSCA, diaspora
‘warlords’ make effective use of the Internet and social networking media to mobilize
and radicalize their constituencies, aggravate hostilities, raise funds and obstruct
reconciliation”(Annex 1.3)
Well, again, the SSC people and leaders are not warlords, they radicalize no one, they
aggravate no hostilities, and they obstruct no reconciliation. Mr. Matt Braydons’s
secessionist friends a.k.a. Somaliland are engaged in all these illegal and destructives
activities. We hope that Mr, Matt Braydon be fortunate enough and blessed to have the
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wisdom and insight to report the true nature of his secessionist friends. We also know that
he understands what his secessionist are all about, but Mr. Matt Braydon chose for
obvious reasons to accuse the victim of aggression – the SSC. The SSC always promote
mutual understanding, peace, and optimism, while the Isaaq secessionists are in a state of
despair for the failure of secession, that they are on the offensive, aggravating hostilities
and obstructing the Somali reconciliation
26. Mr. Matt Braydon wrongly illustrates, “4. …Sool region has since remained divided but
relatively stable, with neither Somaliland nor Puntland eager to engage in direct
confrontation with the other for control of the region. But the emergence of the SSCA,
which challenges the influence of both administrations, has served as a catalyst for
growing tension and military escalation, and complicated the prospects of a peaceful,
political settlement of the disputed region”(Annex 1.3)
The wrong premise is that the SSC territories are disputed. Since when these SSC
territories were disputed?!!!
Somalia is one country with many tribal make up with distinct territories. If the central
government had collapsed, it does not mean that some tribes could lay claim on other
tribes’ territories. Why should the Isaaq in the north west of Somalia or the Majeerteen in
north east of Somalia lay claim on the Dhulbahante Land. They both should stay away
from the SSC and confine to their tribal space, this is simple and straight forward. The
Majeerteen were invited to the SSC territories in the establishment of the Puntland
partnership in 1998, but that now had ended and Puntland with their defeat and retreat in
October 2007 no longer present in the SSC. What is needed at the moment is the
secessionist Isaaq militia to evacuate the small parts of SSC they occupy. Therefore, it’s
not the SSC, but the presence of other tribes’ militias crossing the tribal boundaries for
the purpose of power and resources that serve as a catalyst for growing tension and
military escalation, and complicates the prospects of peaceful political settlement in
Somalia. Once the secessionist isaaq militia peacefully evacuates the SSC territories if
they so choose or forced to leave, will come the time the secessionist Isaaq authorties
would accept to be part of the larger Somali reconciliation process. While as long as they
hang on the SSC territories and cause trouble, wars, destruction, displacement,
kidnapping and bloodshed, they would keep thinking that an international recognition is
imminent. Thus, the international community is complacent with the secession and
effectively has an influential role to play as they largely provide funding for the secession
project. The international community should use its financial/political clout and persuade
the secessionist clan withdraws its militias from the SSC and push them become an active
and honest participant in the larger Somali reconciliation process
27. Matt Braydon reiterates the propaganda and the divide and rule tactics employed by the
secessionist Isaaqs and Majeerteens of Puntland, he says, “(9. …The organization
engendered mixed feelings within the Dhubahante clan …many of whom perceived it as
a political platform for disgruntled Faarah Garaad leaders… and was perceived as a
potential threat by leaders in Somaliland, Puntland and Ethiopia. On 21 May 2010,
Ethiopian forces launched a raid against SSCA militia in Buuhoodle town, on the Somali-
Ethiopian border (Annex 1.3)
In both camps, the secessionist Isaaq camp and the Majeerteen Puntland camp, you can
find few individuals of Farah Garaad and Mohamud Garaad in each camp. As such, there
are no Farah Garaad or Mohamud Garaad leaders who are disgruntled, and that is beside
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the point, because those who chose to serve other tribes interests over theirs are not
representative of the SSC and not regarded as SSC leaders. The SSC leaders from all
tribes of the Dhulbahante are those who established and operate the SSC Regional
Administration of Somalia.
The SSC administration is not a threat to anyone (Isaaq, Majeerteen, Ethiopia, or anyone
else). The Isaaq and the Majeerteen are the threat to SSC and the Dhulbahante Land.
The incident of 21 May 2010: It has been revealed later that the Ethiopian forces were
from the Somali Kililka 5aad, and they were completely Isaaq from Gaashaamo. The
Isaaq secessionists in Hargeisa were behind the mobilization of those forces (corrupting
their commanders) to stir unrest in Buuhodleh town in order to disturb the SSC
reinforcements to the battles of WidhWidh at the time. At the time of the incident, the
secessionist Isaaq militias were engaged with their attacks against the SSC’s Widhwidh
in attempts to capture Buuhodleh. The SSC leaders and the Ethiopian authorities have
discussed that unfortunate incident and agreed upon safeguarding the mutual peace and
security in the region and cooperate in a lot of other areas. The SSC and the Ethiopian
relations are historically very long, growing, productive, and healthy. The Dhulbahante
have huge stakes in the Ethiopian Kililka 5aad in terms of territories and population
which is greater than any other tribe in Somalia. Both Ethiopia and Dhulbahante
understand well this fact and willing to cooperate in all fronts
28. Mr. Matt Braydon in discussing the kalshaale conflict states in his report, “10….In late
2010, businessmen from the Isaaq / Habar Je’elo sub-clan constructed some cement water
reservoirs (known as berkedo) in the Kaalshaale area — a grazing area shared between
the Habar Je’elo and
neighbouring clans of the Dhulbahante / Faarah Garaad. The construction of the
reservoirs was interpreted by the local Dhulbahante as an attempt by the Habar Je’elo to
lay claim to the territory”(Annex 1.3)
First of all, the kalshaale, Hagoogane, and Maygaagle are exclusively Dhulbahante
property; it’s not a shared grazing area. Yes, according to the traditions and Somali
customary laws other clans are allowed for grazing and drinking water at the time of
need. In this case, not only the Habar Je’elo constructed a number of illegal cement
reservoirs, but actually laid claim on the territory. The facts contradict Matt Braydon’s
assertion that the construction of reservoirs was interpreted by the local Dhulbahante as
an attempt by the Habar Je’elo to lay claim to the territory.
29. Also about the Kalshaale battles, Mr. Matt Braydon continues, “10. The Somaliland
administration rushed forces to the area — a move widely perceived among the
Dhulbahante as supporting their Habar Je’elo adversaries” (Annex 1.3)
The Dhulbahante believes the construction of reservoirs was an intentional provocation
on the part of the secessionist camp in order to lay claim on the territory and a pretext to
capture Buuhodleh. The secessionist president, Ahmed Silanyo, not only rushed forces to
the conflict but mobilized heavily armed forces with all sorts of heavy weaponry and
civilian militias and decreed that all areas of Kalshaale, Hagoogane, amd Magaagle will
effective immediately become Isaaq forces and militias permanent bases!!! Mr. Silanyo
went further to speak with the media asking and calling upon all the Isaaq population
(young and old) to take arms against the SSC, adding the he had the confidence they will
do just that (Recorded)
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30. Matt Braydon attempts to underestimate the SSC army and its civilian militias’s might
and power (acting in self defense) he writes, “13. The SSCA’s description of the situation
appears to have been exaggerated for propaganda purposes” (Annex 1.3). However, this
statement contradicts his other statement that reads, “15. Ultimately, the Kaalshaale
clashes were resolved by a three-point agreement:
• Somaliland forces were withdrawn from the immediate area
• The reservoirs were buried (and the Somaliland authorities offered
compensation to their ‘owners’)
• All prisoners on both sides were released. (Annex 1.3)
These conditions were dictated by the victorious SSC authorities through the media,
without any face to face negotiations. The secessionist authorities were forced to accept
defeat, and they did so for their own good because they understood the serious
consequences if they did not act quickly – they risked more far reaching outcome that had
the potential to end the secession project in the battle ground
Also, the secessionist highest military commander, Nuh Tani, speaking with the media
couldn’t conceal his shock in finding out the SSC’ power. A frightened Nuh Tani tells the
media that they are facing powerful forces, and as he put it, the situation is completely
different than they thought (not a drive through)
31. Mr. Matt Braydon concludes his remarks by pointing out, “16….In the
absence of genuine political dialogue, the situation in Sool region remains ripe for the
SSCA or other spoilers to reignite armed conflict” (Annex 1.3)
However, the genuine spoilers are the aggressive secessionist authorities and their
militias. The SSC Regional Administration and the SSC people are in their territories and
are just acting on legitimate self defense; they will stay there forever and grow stronger
by the day. It’s in everyone’s interest the secessionist aggression and expansion stop and
they withdraw to their tribal space. It’s also the UN Security Council’s responsibility to
order the Isaaq secessionist clan stop the aggression against neighboring tribes and
change its behavior
32. On a high level SSC delegation who visited the capital Mogadishu in December 2010 for
talks with the transitional federal government, Matt Braydon writes,”9 When the TFG
received a delegation of SSCA leaders in mid-December 2010 and, according to
unconfirmed media reports, provided a combination of military and/or financial
assistance, Puntland President Faroole responded by accusing unnamed TFG Ministers
from Puntland of supporting “anti-peace elements”.
Not only Faroole who raised these accusations, but also the Isaaq representatives within
the TFG (Hayir and others). The irony was that the Isaaq representatives within the TFG
sought to defend the secession and attacked the unionist SSC who support the TFG they
claim to be members of. It’s not surprising to see the Isaaq secession and Puntland both
the products of rebellion groups (SNM and SSDF respectively) working together in
bringing down any prospect of Somalia government comeback.
The TFG did not provide any financial/military assistance to the SSC as a result of that
visit. However, they sides (TFG and SSC delegation) had discussed the way forward to
move the Somalia reconciliation process. They also reaffirmed that SSC is a legitimate
autonomous regional administration under the transitional government as the charter
permits. It appears that Mr. Matt braydon, the Isaaq secessionists, and Puntland seek to
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make it illegal that the TFG assist the SSC. However, as long as, the SSC part and parcel
of the TFG, it’s the TFG’s mandate and responsibility to defend the SSC, send troops and
everything else to make sure the secession has no foot hold in these regions
33. Currently, in this month of August 2011, there is other high delegation of SSC visiting
again the capital of Mogadishu and in talks with the TFG. The delegation is also meeting
the traditional and political leaders of other Somali tribes in the south. Reports coming
from Mogadishu indicate that the delegation has so far met with the Assembly of Unity
for the Hawiye Tribes (Golaha Midnimada Beelaha Hawiye). Both sides agreed on
strengthening the Somali unity and stressed on the need too advance the Somalia
reconciliation process
34. Obviously, the SSC is everywhere with other Somalis facilitating peace, security,
harmony, reconciliation, and development
35. Clearly, the Isaaq secessionists are no where and isolated themselves from the
reconciliation process. They are fully engaged in mobilize and radicalizing their
constituencies, aggravate hostilities, raise funds (locally and internationally) and obstruct
reconciliation
36. The international community and the UN Security Council’s positions are in full support
to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia. The SSC is part of the legitimate
Somali Transitional Government, and so its position is in line with that of the
international community and the UN Security Council
37. Mr. Matt Braydon’s report is not in line with the international community positions. He is
supporting somalia’s one clan based secessionist group a.k.a. Somaliland. He is against
the Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its supporters. Therefore, Mr.
Matt Braydon has violated his UN mandate and Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity
38. Finally, Mr. Matt Braydon makes the following recommendation, and states, “448. The
Monitoring Group recommends that:
(b) In line with Security Council resolution 1844 (2008), paragraph 8 (a),
individuals and entities that threaten to destabilize stable areas, to militarize
political or social conflicts or to incite inter-communal violence should be
considered subject to targeted measures, together with their financiers, facilitators and
active supporters;…”
Obviously, the Isaaq secessionists a.k.a Somaliland are the guilty party that needs to be
dealt with
39. Perfect, the Isaaq secessionists a.k.a. Somaliland are beyond any doubt in violation of this
UN Security Council’s Resolution 1844 (2008), paragraph 8 (a), they did not threaten to
stabilize, they already destabilized the stable areas of the SSC, they militarized political
and social conflicts and incited inter-communal violence. The Isaaq secessionists armed
and sent their tribal militias to the SSC regions for the purpose of revenge, reprisal, and
force an desired secession on the unionist SSC. The Isaaq secessionists rejected to stay in
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their tribal territories and reconcile with the other Somali tribes to peacefully and
mutually reach a political and social settlement through the legitimate Somali
reconciliation Process being facilitated and sponsored by the United Nations and
International Community. The Isaaq secessionists announced their unilateral secession in
1991, and waited until late 2004 to attack the Dhulbahante Land (SSC). They waited 13
years to amass weaponry and funds to inflict the SSC the most possible damage. With all
that damage, destruction, killing, kidnapping, and displacements they brought down on
the SSC people and territories, the horror secessionist militia are only present in few
pockets in the SSC as 99.9% of the SSC population is against them. The only way
forward that can bring about peace and security is this clan militia withdraws to its tribal
space.
We hope that the UN Security Council holds the Isaaq Secessionist Authority in Hargeisa
accountable for the violations of this resolution together with their financiers, facilitators,
and active supporters.
Thank You,