1. (C) Summary: During a November 18 meeting with Somalia
Unit Poloff, key Ras Kamboni leaders denounced Hisbul Islam
leader Sheikh Dahir Aweys, discussed recent fighting between
the Darod/Kabalah alliance and al-Shabaab in Lower Juba and
recounted recent events. Ras Kamboni leaders said that they
were not receiving support from Aweys and that Aweys in fact
was working against them. Darod/Kabalah forces reportedly
killed over a dozen al-Shabaab fighters during recent
fighting but feared al-Shabaab was receiving reinforcements
from Bay and Bakool regions and from Mogadishu. Ras Kamboni
leaders told Poloff that an original plan, which had been
brokered with the TFG and Kenya, had involved militia
commander Ahmed Madobe and the Darod/Kabalah alliance. The
plan was scrapped, they said, when figures inside and outside
the TFG dissuaded President Sharif and the Kenyans from
working with Madobe. We are encouraging all forces
confronting al-Shabaab in Lower Juba to resist the
long-standing Somali tendency to fracture and re-align when
momentum in their favor begins to wane. End summary.
Ras Kamboni Leaders
Denounce Aweys
-----------------
2. (C) During a November 18 meeting, Madobe's
second-in-command Serar, joined by Hassan al-Turki's
son-in-law Raghe, and Madobe's foreign affairs representative
Abdiaziz recounted for Somalia Unit Poloff recent events in
Lower Juba. (Note: Madobe himself participated in the
discussion by telephone from Lower Juba. Serar had just
arrived from Lower Juba and planned to return to the region
within a few days. Raghe reportedly fell out with al-Turki
several months ago because of al-Turki's willingness to
reconcile with al-Shabaab. End note.) The group alleged that
they were receiving no money from Aweys. In fact, they said,
Aweys was undercutting them by attempting to reconcile with
al-Shabaab. Serar said that Ras Kamboni's decision to fight
al-Shabaab was taken unilaterally because it was in the
interest of the Darod/Kabalah subclan.
Fighting Recommences
--------------------
3. (C) According to the group, fighting between Darod/Kabalah
clan forces, some led by Madobe, and al-Shabaab militia in
Lower Juba resumed in mid-November when the rains stopped.
Serar said that local clan militias joined by Madobe's troops
were positioned at three fronts: Abdi Libriole, Jana Abdile,
and Xagar. The most recent fighting had occurred in Xagar,
which is located between Afmadow and Dhoble. Serar told us
that local clan militia on November 16 captured a technical
from al-Shabaab in Xagar and killed over a dozen al-Shabaab
fighters. Following the fighting, al-Shabaab was bringing in
reinforcements from Bay and Bakool regions and from
Mogadishu. Serar expressed frustration that the TFG was not
impeding the flow of al-Shabaab fighters out of Mogadishu.
Al-Shabaab leader Godane and al-Qaeda operative Harun Fazul
were in Xagar on November 17 recruiting for al-Shabaab, Serar
said. Our contacts tell us that al-Shabaab forces on November
21 took control of Afmadow. (Note: We think it is unlikely
that al-Shabaab will be able to hold Afmadow because it is
the stronghold of Madobe's subclan. End note.) Serar said
that forces confronting al-Shabaab in Lower Juba are
receiving support from the Somali diaspora and the local
community.
Madobe Cut Out
Of Kenya Plan
--------------
4. (C) Serar said that Madobe and other Lower Juba commanders
began talking to the TFG months ago. These conversations were
kept quiet because Madobe feared that, if made public, they
might cause Hisbul Islam and al-Shabaab to join forces. In
addition, Raghe confirmed that TFG Prime Minister Sharmarke,
as Sharmarke reported to us in October, had delivered USD
50,000 to Madobe. Serar and Madobe said that the original
plan, brokered with former TFG Defense Minister Gandi, was
that the Kenyan government would train Somali advisors in
NAIROBI 00002397 002.2 OF 003
Kenya who would then re-enter Lower Juba and provide
assistance to Madobe's forces and Darod/Kabalah militia.
Serar said that Madobe assured the Kenyans that his militia
did not present a threat. In order to win support, Madobe's
militia had many times captured al-Shabaab operatives
attempting to cross the border into Kenya, Serar alleged.
Madobe said that Kenya had welcomed the idea of cooperation.
5. (C) However, just before his removal as Minister of
Defense, Gandi reportedly told Serar that the training would
now happen in Kenya. In the course of their contacts, the
group concluded that there was "more than one TFG." Deputy
Prime Minister Sharif Hassan and other unnamed TFG officials
reportedly dissuaded Sheikh Sharif from working with Madobe,
General Morgan, and other Marehan clan leaders. Gandi asked
Madobe to induce the Darod/Kabalah militia to train at GOK
training camps but Madobe, suspicious of the involvement of
Sharif Hassan and General Morgan, suspected that the plan was
in fact designed to get his forces out of Lower Juba.
6. (C) Serar said his persistent efforts to maintain contact
with the TFG were unsuccessful after Gandi's removal as TFG
Minister of Defense. Madobe and Serar said they were willing
to work with the Kenyans and with the Somalis that the
Kenyans were recruiting in northeast Kenya but they worried
that Sharif Hassan intended the Kenyan-trained forces as an
alternative to Madobe and other local militias in Lower Juba.
(Note: It is likely that, if the Kenyans deploy the Somali
refugees and ethnic Somali Kenyans that they have been
training into Lower Juba, the result will be intra-clan
fighting and not a united front against al-Shabaab. End
note.)
Negotiating
With the Marehan
----------------
7. (C) The group said that their ultimate aim was to push
al-Shabaab out of lower Juba and to unite the Darod in the
region. They hoped ultimately to create a Juba State. While
they believed that the Darod/Marehan in Gedo should
concentrate on al-Shabaab in Gedo, the group acknowledged
that they were attempting to negotiate with the Marehan in
Kismayo. (Note: It appeared clear that the group thought the
Marehan should govern the Gedo region of a Juba State. The
group said the Kabalah, because they represent the
overwhelming majority in the region, should govern Lower
Juba. End note.) As many as 100 of a reported 190 armed
Marehan reportedly left their tactical alliance with
al-Shabaab in Kismayo and joined the Darod/Kabalah alliance.
(The Marehan change of heart reportedly came after a recent
al-Shabaab assassination of a key Marehan business figure in
Kismayo.)
8. (C) The group said that Marehan business figures are
attempting to convince the Marehan in Kismayo to form an
alliance with the Darod Kabalah. (Note: The Marehan are
negotiating from a position of weakness. They are only a
small fraction of the Lower Juba population. We think that
this relative position of weakness in Kismayo is likely to
force continued Kismayo Marehan negotiations with the
Darod/Kabalah. End note.) Other contacts tell us, however,
that Marehan business leaders are attempting to better their
negotiating position by reaching out to the international
community. (Note: We think that emboldening the Kismayo
Marehan could act as a destabilizing factor. End note.)
9. (C) Comment: The stalemate in Lower Juba is likely to
continue, with territory periodically changing hands.
Al-Shabaab and aligned militia will most likely remain in
control of Kismayo for the time being. We think that the
introduction of the Kenyan-trained forces would most likely
embolden al-Shabaab rather than weaken it, as intra-Darod
forces turned to fight each other while al-Shabaab remained
in control of the port. Those opposed to support for the
Darod/Kabalah alliance appear to have won the internal TFG
battle for now. Negotiations between the Marehan in Kismayo
and the Darod/Kabalah may bring a modicum of additional power
to the Kabalah alliance but any effort by the Marehan in Gedo
to push into Lower Juba would only fuel intra-Darod conflict
and embolden al-Shabaab. We are encouraging all forces
confronting al-Shabaab in Lower Juba to resist the
NAIROBI 00002397 003 OF 003
long-standing Somali tendency to fracture and re-align when
momentum begins to wane.
RANNEBERGER
Now because of those falsehood, madobe is changing demographics and forcefully assimilating non daarood/hawiye clan into harti namely awrmale clan
deni the islamist KFC lifetime member is once again perpetrating the lie of kabalah clan majority in lower juba and kismaayo.
if kabalah clan are majority why wont the liberate lower juba themselves with marexaan, its because their goal was kismaayo port and they know without external support the natieve marehan of lower juba will drive them out
